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In the last years, research on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has become
one of the primary matters for the development of modern societies. Water, power,
banking, transportation and communication systems are only a few examples of
essential infrastructures to daily human activities and their protection is a concept
relating to the preparedness and response to serious incidents that could threaten
them. The term protection is a broader concept in which three main aspects can
be individuated: safety, security, and emergency. The safety aspects are out of the
scope of this thesis, indeed, the focus is on security. In particular, this investigation
will address the concerns of security tied to physical and human factors without
considering those related to the cyber ones. This is because the present work is
born in the railway context, where the attention is usually oriented to the physical
aspects of security since, until now, a common practice has been to realize dedi-
cated connections and isolated networks. With respect to the emergency aspects,
only the advantages that a security solution can induce will considered. Physi-
cal security is one of the most fundamental aspect of the protection. It concerns
the use of physical controls for protecting premises, sites, facilities, buildings or
other physical assets belonging to the critical sectors. The application of physical
security is the process of using layers of physical protective measures to prevent
unauthorized access or harm. This harm can involve terrorism, theft, destruction,
sabotage, vandalism, espionage, and similar. A crucial element which contributes
to improve the protection of critical infrastructures seamlessly is the technology.
Thanks to fast technological progress, it is possible to build complex surveillance
systems able to integrate heterogeneous sources which can monitor environments
potentially at risk. In this way, resilience may be accomplished, for example,
through hardening the system by adding redundancy and robustness. However,
for enhancing signiﬁcantly the protection level, integration of diﬀerent technolo-
gies is not enough, but a collaborative approach is essential. A strong protection
calls for interoperability not only among ICT systems, but also among diﬀerent
operators, organizations, companies, and any other entity belonging to the public
security sector. Nevertheless, the security designer must determine how best to
combine elements like fences, barriers, sensors, procedures, security systems, and
security personnel into a Physical Security System (PPS) that can achieve the
protection objectives. For this reason, another important element is to conduct
a systematic evaluation in which quantitative and/or qualitative techniques are
used to predict overall system eﬀectiveness, by identifying exploitable weaknesses
in asset protection for a given threat. The original contribution of this thesis is
to provide methods for enhancing eﬀectiveness and reliability of integrated secu-
rity systems in order to guarantee an adequate protection level. To achieve the
desired level of protection, a two phase approach is proposed combining proactive
and reactive strategies. The ﬁrst one involves the vulnerability assessment based
on quantitative methods and the second one introduces an interoperability frame-
work. Speciﬁcally, this thesis is the result of research funded by Ansaldo STS, a
leader company in railway industry, and carried out also thanks to involvement in
research projects about security theme (such as SECUR-ED and METRIP).
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Introduction
Security of contemporary society is a primary concern broadly discussed in recent
years, especially in connection with the spread of international terrorism which
still represents a complicated issue to contain or, at least, to mitigate. This has
contributed to generate a considerable feeling of being unsafe among the popula-
tion, since their lives are strictly dependent on the use of complex infrastructures
deﬁned as "critical". They allow to simplify and accelerate the main human ac-
tivities and, for this reason, they are often the target of criminal, vandalistic and
terroristic actions. At this aim, the European Union has established legislative in-
struments (e.g. the directive 2008/114/EC [3] establishes a procedure for identify-
ing and designating European Critical Infrastructures and a common approach for
assessing the need to improve their protection) and ﬁnancial ones (e.g the Secure
Societies-Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens programme
in HORIZON 2020) in order to protect critical infrastructures. In particular, the
European Parliament deﬁnes a critical infrastructure as an asset, system or part
thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital
societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of peo-
ple, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a signiﬁcant impact
in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions. From
this deﬁnition, the key role and the importance that these infrastructures have in
the current society comes to light, and consequently the need for enhancing their
security is felt. Even if the responsibility to deﬁne objectives is a task of the In-
stitutions, the fulﬁllment of measures for reducing vulnerability of strategic assets
depends mainly on the eﬀort and actions of the diﬀerent authorities and organi-
zations involved, belonging to both public and private sectors. It is clear that, in
order to meet this need, a multidisciplinary research is necessary to develop and
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implement new technological solutions able to provide a proper reaction against
the main threats for citizens' global security, respecting the people's basic rights.
The work described in this thesis takes up the challenge of deal with the issues
described above, trying to combine research and technology as a result of joint sup-
port of University and Company in order to encourage innovation, also through
technology transfer processes between academic and manufacturing community.
Speciﬁcally, this thesis is the result of research funded by Ansaldo STS, an in-
ternational railway transportation leader in the ﬁeld of signaling and integrated
transport systems for passenger traﬃc and freight operation, and carried out also
thanks to involvement in research projects about security theme (such as SECUR-
ED1 and METRIP2). In this perspective, the area of interest of this work is the
critical infrastructure protection, focusing on physical security.
The physical protection of CIs requires the development of innovative approaches
for identiﬁcation, detection and mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities and risks.
Hence, it represents an area in which practical needs (e.g., coming from end-users),
technological resources (e.g., belonging to physical security market) and scientiﬁc
research (e.g., evaluation of eﬀectiveness of physical protection system) converge
all together. In such context, the thesis concerns two aspects of the protection
that together can contribute to enhance the eﬀectiveness of the protection: i) an
architectural approach which enables the interoperability of security systems and
involved organizations; and ii) an analytical approach for evaluating the eﬀective-
ness of the overall protection system. At this aim, this thesis is structured as
follows:
• Chapter 1 provides an overview of the physical security and the main open
issues. In particular, it addresses the aspects consisting of the architecture
and analysis of the Physical Protection Systems. The chapter also describes
the railway domain, the application ﬁeld of this work.
• Chapter 2 presents a methodology for the vulnerability assessment of a PPS
that has been partially supported by the METRIP project. It concerns a
MDE approach in which an UML proﬁle, a vulnerability model, and the
model transformations have been deﬁned.
1http://www.secur-ed.eu/
2http://metrip.unicampus.it/
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• Chapter 3 reports the experience with the concrete application of a System-
of-Systems conducted in the SECUR-ED project. In particular, an innova-
tive interoperability framework, which represents a technological approach
for improving physical protection, will be presented.
• Chapter 4 deals with a case study, performed on a real metro system, where
both the approaches included in the previous chapters will be applied, in
order to show that vulnerability analysis and security management are the
two sides of the same coin.

Chapter 1
Physical Protection
In the last years, research on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has become
one of the primary matters for the development of modern societies. Water, power,
banking, transportation and communication systems are only a few examples of
essential infrastructures to daily human activities and their protection is a concept
relating to the preparedness and response to serious incidents that could threaten
them. Moreover, the last traumatic events have given still more prominence to
protection of CIs. A recent work [4] presents a comprehensive literature review of
signiﬁcant extreme events that occurred in the past two decades which exposes an
insuﬃcient preparedness and maturity in case of serious events.
The Council of the European Union states, protection means all activities aimed
at ensuring the functionality, continuity and integrity of critical infrastructures in
order to deter, mitigate and neutralize a threat, risk or vulnerability [3].
As reﬂected in this deﬁnition, the term protection is a broader concept in which
three main aspects can be individuate: safety, security, and emergency. Safety
involves the safeguard or protection against events or situations generally unin-
tentional such as malfunctioning or faults of systems, accidents caused by human
carelessness, inattentiveness, lack of training, and so on. Instead, security refers
to the safeguard or protection of people and assets against attacks, assaults, and
damages carried out voluntarily by individual or organizations in order to harm.
This includes civil disturbances, sabotage, theft of critical property or information,
pilferage, extortion or other intentional attacks on assets by a human. Emergency
5
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refers to all those activities which have to be undertaken when safety and/or
security fail and consequently require intervention of rescue teams such as ﬁrst
responders, civil protection, ﬁre brigade, and so on. Thus, it regards the contain-
ment of hazard and minimization of damages. The relationships between these
aspects are depicted in ﬁgure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Aspects of protection
Often the binomial safety-security is used indiscriminately, but, as highlighted,
the two terms diﬀer in the triggering events of a disaster. For in-depth analysis,
in [5] the authors explain how to avoid ambiguities in the terms security and
safety. On the contrary, the emergency does not focus on the origin of crisis, but
manages its consequences. Furthermore, security can aﬀect safety; for example,
a disgruntled employee can sabotage critical equipment causing a disaster which
can appear at a ﬁrst glance like a lack of safety measures.
The safety aspects are out of the scope of this thesis, indeed, the focus is on the
security. Nevertheless, this investigation will address the concerns of security tied
to physical and human factors without considering those related to the cyber ones.
This is because the present work is born in the railway context, where the attention
is usually oriented to the physical aspects of security since, until now, a common
practice has been to realize dedicated connections and isolated networks. With
respect to the emergency aspects, only the advantages that a security solution can
induce will considered.
A security threat is always attributable to a location (within a bus, a station plat-
form, etc.) at a given moment (when there is a crowd, after a football game, etc.)
and involves someone (criminal, bomber, suicidal person, etc.) and/or something
harmful (bomb, gun, toxic gas, ﬁre, knife, etc.). In order to face such critical
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situations the security strategies that can be adopted are fundamentally three:
proactive (stop the event before it occurs), reactive (act to limit the impact of
the event, if the previous strategy fails), and forensic (get information to put the
system back in operation). Obviously, from a security perspective, the best is
to be as proactive as possible (stopping terrorists before they burst their bomb is
preferable than ﬁnding the culprits), but it is very hard to meet this objective from
a technological point of view. Using disparate technologies surely will help to have
a reactive behavior to threats, while the proactive eﬀect will be strictly limited
to the motivations inciting an attacker. Generally, a proactive approach involves
assessment methodologies, more or less detailed and complex, able to analyze or
prove the protection levels of an infrastructure. Eventually, the forensic strategies
can help to understand the dynamics of a successful attack in order to discover
where and why the system failed. In addition, they allow to gather important
information useful for facing future threats.
1.1 Physical Security
Physical security is one of the most fundamental aspect of the protection. It con-
cerns the use of physical controls for protecting premises, sites, facilities, buildings
or other physical assets belonging to the critical sectors. The application of physi-
cal security is the process of using layers of physical protective measures to prevent
unauthorized access or harm. This harm can involve terrorism, theft, destruction,
sabotage, vandalism, espionage, and similar.
The choice among the physical security measures to be adopted depends greatly
on what assets need to be protected, where they are located, and what threats,
vulnerabilities, and risks pertain to them. Thus, applying an appropriate level of
protection requires a speciﬁc understanding of environment under consideration
as well as the threats to which is exposed. In order to accomplish this, it is clear
that an eﬀective design have to be carried out. So, an eﬀective design involves
the use of multiple layers of interdependent systems and covers all the means and
technologies for perimeter, external and internal protection such as barrier, light-
ing, diﬀerent kinds of sensors, closed-circuit television, access control, and people.
In this phase the choice of technological security systems and the adoption of
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architectures for integrating such systems play an important role, since they are
eﬀective means that contribute to increase resilience of a CI, providing early warn-
ing of threats and improving the response to eventual disasters.
However, the activities tied to security design are very diﬃcult considered the com-
plexity and interconnectedness of current infrastructures, the lack of standards in
physical security matters, the diversity of threats, and the diﬀerent local regula-
tions. Furthermore, the cost of physical security is not insigniﬁcant. Reaching
an appropriate balance between adequate levels of protection and the cost of the
systems enabling physical protection can be hard. Too little security leaves vul-
nerabilities in place, increasing risks. Too much security may mitigate threats and
vulnerabilities and reduce risks, but leads to unnecessary expenditures. Ineﬃcient
application of security controls (spending more than you need for a physical secu-
rity service or product) may use scarce resources that otherwise would be available
for additional protective measures [6]. Consequently, a trade-oﬀ between costs and
eﬀective protection based on their contributions to risk reduction is necessary.
Translating strategic security objectives into wise choices is a challenging design
problem both when designing a new physical security system and when upgrading
to an existing system. In the context of infrastructure resilience and protection
some considerations have been made for guaranteeing a certain risk level.
A crucial element which contributes to improve the protection of critical infras-
tructures seamlessly is the technology. Thanks to the fast technological progress,
it is possible to build complex surveillance systems able to integrate heterogeneous
sources which can monitor environments potentially at risk. In this way, resilience
may be accomplished, for example, through hardening the system by adding re-
dundancy and robustness. However, for enhancing signiﬁcantly the protection
level, integration of diﬀerent technologies is not enough, but a collaborative ap-
proach is essential. A strong protection calls for interoperability not only among
ICT systems, but also among diﬀerent operators, organizations, companies, and
any other entity belonging to the public security sector. This lead to look into
System-of-Systems approaches, whose issues are still subject matter for discussion,
since they are systems evolving continuously and quickly [7]. All this makes up
the tools for managing the complexity of the protection and for reducing the in-
tervention times lending support to crisis management with a better promptness.
Nevertheless, the designer must determine how best to combine elements like
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fences, barriers, sensors, procedures, security systems, and security personnel into
a Physical Security System (PPS) that can achieve the protection objectives. For
this reason, another important element is to conduct a systematic evaluation in
which quantitative and/or qualitative techniques are used to predict overall sys-
tem eﬀectiveness, by identifying exploitable weaknesses in asset protection for a
deﬁned threat. A typical weakness of the PPS is quite the lack of a global and
integrated vulnerability evaluation. Traditionally, their eﬀectiveness evaluation
was due to judgments of experts because of the lack of scientiﬁc methods able to
provide systematic and objective estimates. On the contrary, an accurate vulnera-
bility assessment can produce results for establishing the requirements during the
design of the PPS and, in addition, it can also support the decisions regarding
protection system upgrades. [8].
1.2 The Vulnerability Problem
Eﬀective protection demands the availability of proper methodologies and tools to
evaluate the vulnerability of the assets, and the ability of the adopted protection
systems to meet its objectives.
The vulnerability is a very complex concept which has more interpretations in
research literature. An accurate disquisition about the term "vulnerability" can
be found in [9], where the author exposes the meaning of the concept in diﬀerent
scientiﬁc research communities. Some interesting deﬁnitions for the context of
this work are Vulnerability is emerging as a multi-dimensional concept involving
at least exposure - the degree to which a human group or ecosystem comes into
contact with particular stresses; sensitivity - the degree to which an exposure unit
is aﬀected by exposure to any set of stresses; and resilience - the ability of the
exposure unit to resist or recover from the damage associated with the convergence
of multiple stresses or vulnerability is an incapacity to anticipate, cope with, re-
sist to, adapt to and recover from hazards. In [10], vulnerability is deﬁned as
the susceptibility to physical injury or threat. For Haims[11], vulnerability is the
manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g. physical, technical, orga-
nizational, cultural) that can be exploited by an adversary to harm or damage the
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system. Therefore, the vulnerability concept implies the possibility that a trau-
matic event causes probable harms.
Several protective factors exist for preventing, limiting and modulating the risk
that such vulnerabilities can induce. The term vulnerability is sometime confused
with risk. In general terms, the risk can be considered as a cumulative index
which expresses the likelihood of the occurrence of an undesirable event and of
the potential damages to the environment, permanent or long-term. Actually, the
vulnerability can be considered as an internal risk factor of a system or a subject
that is exposed to a threat and it corresponds to its intrinsic predisposition to be
aﬀected to damage[12]. Then, reducing vulnerability can reduce risk and conse-
quently increase resilience which in turn may reduce the consequences of a disaster.
1.2.1 Vulnerability Assessment
The Vulnerability Assessment (VA) is a proactive strategy for improving infras-
tructure security and it is able to provide essential information that may be used in
the Risk Assessment process. Risk Assessment requires a suitable understanding
of both threats and vulnerabilities. Both of them should be identiﬁed, but gener-
ally the threats often remain out of control, while vulnerabilities may be corrected
through security countermeasures. This means it is very hard to stop the eﬀorts
of an international terrorist group in advance, but it is possible to strengthen the
security in the weak points of an infrastructure.
One of the most delicate task is to evaluate risk and vulnerability. In this per-
spective the analysis can be both quantitative and qualitative. In a quantitative
analysis, an adequate quantity of numerical data is necessary for calculating the
risk of an attack in terms of probability. Very often such data are not available
and thus a qualitative analysis may be better suited. These kinds of methods
require generally less eﬀort and, in certain cases, can be also used in support of
quantitative methods.
Given the broad spectrum of existing critical infrastructures, some methodologies
either quantitative or qualitative have emerged in academic literature but, in prac-
tice, the most used methods are qualitative. [13] provides a state of the art of risk
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methodologies; certain methods include both risk analysis and vulnerability anal-
ysis, while others are more suited to speciﬁc systems or a speciﬁc need. Generally,
existing quantitative methodologies focus on one kind of critical infrastructure
such as telecommunications (in [14] is possible to ﬁnd an overview of approaches
for evaluating network vulnerabilities), critical information systems ( [15] proposes
a methodology for a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system),
water system (in [16] a parametric-system method based on background value is
used for the quantitative assessment of each subsystem and of the integrated water
resources system), and so on. Finally, in [17], Ezell et al. provide a description of
the probabilistic techniques widely used to carry out risk and vulnerability anal-
ysis.
A well-known formula used in risk analysis ﬁeld is the following[18]:
Risk = Threat · V ulnerability · Consequence (1.1)
that is, risk represents the expected consequences of attacks, taking into account
the likelihood that attacks occur and that they are successful, if attempted. In
spite of its simplicity, this formula needs the evaluation of three parameters whose
value is hard to compute especially in quantitative terms.
A quantitative deﬁnition of the vulnerability is given by Lewis [19], who deﬁnes it
as "a conditional probability", that is the probability that an asset suﬀers damages
if an attack occurs or, in probabilistic terms:
V ulnerability = P (attack results in damage|attack occurs) (1.2)
Note that the measure speciﬁed above does not include magnitude of the damage.
This measure assumes a representation of vulnerability in which there is either a
successful attack with damage or no success with no damage [18].
Traditionally, the literature exhibits two distinct research branches for addressing
vulnerability evaluation: threat-driven and asset-driven.
The threat-driven approaches are suitable for analyzing the initiating events that
are well understood and whose rate of occurrence can be reliably deducted from
historical data. The main disadvantage of these approach is that they ultimately
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fail to consider emerging or unrecognized threats devised by an innovative ad-
versary [20]. A recent threat-driven approach can be found in [21]. This paper
presents an asset vulnerability model based on his earlier work in game theory and
designed to provide a strategic risk measure which is predicated on the probability
of failure of an attacker.
Asset-driven approaches search for sensitive points that attackers can exploit to
kill a lot of people and damage environmental assets. Thus, they focus on ﬁnding
and mitigating vulnerabilities regardless of whether a speciﬁc kind of event has
occurred. In other word, these methods estimate the consequences and probabil-
ity of success of an attacker for an exhaustive set of plausible scenarios, without
considering their occurrence probability [22].
Other approaches that does not belong to these two categories exist and they can
be found in [21].
Up to now, a little attention has been devoted to approaches which integrate more
aspects. In [8], Garcia considers both of them, but the attacks are considered form
an high level of detail. An interesting work moving towards this direction is [23],
where the authors present a novel attack tree paradigm, called attack countermea-
sure tree, which takes into account attacks as well as countermeasures (in the form
of detection and mitigation events). Again, [24] provides an intuitive and visual
representation of interactions between an attacker and a defender of a system, as
well as the evolution of the security mechanisms and vulnerabilities of a system.
Finally, many studies on vulnerability assessment focus on modelling of the CIs'
interdependencies. In these works, typically, the adopted approaches aim to un-
derstand structural vulnerabilities through "what-if" analysis and simulations in
order to asses and mitigate the risk of domino eﬀects and multiple disruptions,
and to provide a support to decision-makers. For example, a popular work is [25],
where the authors explore the challenges and complexities of the interdependencies
making an analysis with respect to diﬀerent dimensions.
1.2.2 Evaluating Physical Protection Systems
A Physical Protection System (PPS) involves systems, procedures and people for
the protection of assets and facilities from malevolent human attacks [26]. The
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capability of a PPS to withstand a possible attack and prevent an attacker from
achieving his objectives is generally speciﬁed as PPS eﬀectiveness. Thus, with re-
spect to the protection measures, assessing the vulnerability corresponds to eval-
uate the eﬀectiveness of the protection systems. The PPS can be considered to be
eﬀective only when it contributes to decrease the risk to an acceptable level.
Quantitative techniques are recommended for facilities with high-consequence loss
assets [8]. In this perspective, Hennessey et al. [27] express the vulnerability term
as
V = 1− PE PE = PD · (PI · PN) PD = PS · PA (1.3)
where:
• PE (Probability of eﬀectiveness) is the probability that the physical protec-
tion system is eﬀective;
• PD (Probability of detection) is calculated through the PS and PA values
and it represents the probability that an attacker has been detected;
• PS (Probability of sensing) is the probability that a sensing system detects
the attack;
• PA (Probability of assessment) is the probability that a security operator at
the control room correctly assess the situation and react accordingly;
• PI (Probability of interruption) is the probability that the reaction to the
attack takes place in time in order to neutralize it;
• PN (Probability of neutralization) is the probability that the reaction suc-
cessfully neutralizes the threat.
There are many quantitative tools that can help the analyst to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of a PPS. For giving an idea, in the following an overview of the most
frequently used techniques for a quantitative evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of a
PPS [28] [26] will be brieﬂy described. Furthermore, other approaches concerning
the evaluation of a PPS face the problem from a point of view of optimization
for optimally locating the physical protection components in order to balance cost
and performance (e.g. see [29] and [30]).
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1.2.2.1 EASI
The Estimated of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) is an easy-to-use method
developed to evaluate PPS performance at nuclear facilities under conditions of
threat and system operation [31]. It is a pathway analysis combined with com-
puter modeling techniques. The method consists of a probabilistic analysis of the
interactions of detection, assessment, communications, delay, and response time.
The results of the analysis are expressed in terms of the probability that the PPS
can respond in time to stop speciﬁc action sequences of an attacker. The basic
principle of this method is that attacks on nuclear facilities can only be averted
after the prompt notiﬁcation and response of the guard force which is presumed
to be adequate. This involves the proper use of alarm systems to be considered in
the evaluation.
1.2.2.2 SAVI
The Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion (SAVI) method evaluates
the vulnerability of a PPS. Features of this method include analysis of all adver-
sary paths, a safeguards-component catalog with a detection/delay performance
database, results in graphic form, and path-upgrade recommendations [32]. Thus,
the method enables to analyze all the possible paths of an attack and evaluate the
most vulnerable paths including the position of a critical detection point along
each path. It uses a multi-path model, called Adversary Sequence Diagram (ASD),
where the facilities and the paths connecting them are represented. Since this ASD
model is too simple, often it causes inaccuracies (i.e the distance needed to cross an
area is considered equal when using the ASD, regardless of the particular route).
1.2.2.3 ASSESS
Developed under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy, the Analytic Sys-
tem and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) is an analyti-
cal tool with the aim to conduct an integrated evaluation of safeguards systems at
facilities handling facilities. This method is a standard procedure in the USA for
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evaluating the PPS of nuclear facilities, airports and other important buildings.
In particular, it focuses on the threat of theft/diversion of special nuclear material
by insiders, outsiders, and a special form of insider/outsider collusion [? ]. As
the previous method, it uses a multi-path model, and, substantially, it is an en-
hanced version of SAVI with additional insider attack analysis and neutralization
modules.
1.2.2.4 ISEM
The Insider Safeguards Eﬀectiveness Model [33] is a stochastic, discrete event,
monte-carlo simulation model which simulates the interaction of a group of insiders
(guards or other employees who have authorized access to the facility) with the
facility's safeguards system. The methodology provides a structure through which
an analyst may choose guard tactics to complement the other portions of the
safeguards system in combating the perceived threat. It is not dependent on the
speciﬁc eﬀectiveness model employed nor on the assumption that the adversary is
an insider. The eﬀectiveness of guard tactics is demonstrated by computing the
eﬀectiveness measure of a range of guard tactics employed in spite of a number of
distinct insider paths through the facility.
1.2.2.5 SAPE
Systematic Analysis of Physical Protection Eﬀectiveness [34] is the most recent
method that presents an intuitive technique for the VA of a PPS. As the previous
techniques, it deals with a pathway analysis in order to determine the ordered series
of a potential adversary's actions (called an adversary path) and to calculate the
probability that a response force will stop this adversary before his/her task is
completed. Nevertheless, unlike the previous ones, the use of a two dimensional
(2D) map of a facility as a model for a PPS is suggested as an alternative approach
to the adversary sequence diagram. Compared to an ASD it has two advantages:
providing an intuitive bird's eye views of a PPS, and representing relative positions
between protection elements in a realistic way.
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1.3 Technological Tools for Physical Security
In the past decade, the security landscape has dramatically changed with the in-
troduction of several new security technologies to deter, detect and react to more
disparate attacks. Organizations are constantly introducing new technologies and
upgrading existing ones in order to ensure the security of their most valuable as-
sets such as people, infrastructure, and property. Typical systems include access
control systems, CCTV systems, intrusion detection systems, ﬁreﬁghting systems,
CBRNe sensors, content video analytics, intelligent sound detection, perimeter in-
truder detection, and so on [35].
Redundancy and diversity of sensing technology is essential to build eﬀective
surveillance systems, but this increases the number of sensing devices and, conse-
quently, of the alarms to be managed. So, the integration of such security systems
has been one of the primary requirements in the scenario of the physical security.
However, regarding the information integration and management, the industry
is still underdeveloped. In fact, potential capabilities of traditional systems are
limited by their low abilities in data analysis and interpretation, resulting in an
inadequate prevention and real-time reaction.
In practical applications, each monitoring system is managed by means of an ad-
hoc software platform. The traditional surveillance solutions include, for example,
VMS (Video Management System), ACS (Access Control System), etc. They
provide an overview of the installed devices (with a related report of diagnostic,
warning, and alert messages) and a set of basic functionalities (e.g. for data acqui-
sition, control, conﬁguration, and rules setting). In this way, each event is handled
separately without an eﬀective information sharing, resulting in a very fragmented
approach to the physical security [1]. Furthermore, the separated use of multiple
systems can even complicate the security management. For example, take a hu-
man operator at the control center: in case of attack he may be inundated of
alert messages, coming from multiple separated interfaces, one for each manage-
ment system of the single technology. Hence, industrial needs require supporting
platforms capable of integrating monitoring components with data processing sub-
systems, with also ﬁnal consumers of produced warnings.
A well-designed integrated security system allows the full control of a CI, unify-
ing alarm signaling, management and control procedures, optimizing the human
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resource necessary. The general architecture (Figure 1.2) is composed by three fun-
damental components: ﬁeld subsystems, communication network, and supervision
and control system [36].
Figure 1.2: General architecture of an integrated security system
The diﬀerent subsystems are distributed within the infrastructure and are able
to send alarms and video streams to the supervision and control system through
the communication network. The supervision and control system is in charge of
analyzing and possibly elaborating data in order to support the decision making.
In addition, if anything it can send commands to ﬁeld subsystems still through
the communication network.
When the emergencies occur, one of the fundamental task is to get the right
information in order to allocate the right resources. Quick collaboration between
local, state, and, in some instances, federal agencies is critical to saving lives
and critical assets. Therefore, security systems must be tightly integrated with
policies, procedures, and protocols to empower decision makers to quickly make
the proper decision [37]. Security oﬃcials need a solution that overcomes the
technology integration, multiple involved operators, and real-time collaboration
challenges, so that all sorts of data are translated to relevant information that may
be shared promptly to support organizations in detecting, analyzing, diagnosing,
and resolving situations. New management technologies, like physical security
information management (PSIM), are enabling these requirements.
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1.3.1 Security Monitoring
Investments in security monitoring are likely to increase. Even if the human ob-
servers theoretically oﬀer the greatest security, they are not enough since it is
necessary to take account the drawbacks of human inattention and limited senses.
The ability to continuously monitor the environment, to detect abnormal condi-
tions, and to capture information of interest, all in real-time, gives the opportunity
to reduce inspection costs while providing for increased security to the public.
Generally, security monitoring requires several sensor devices that are based on
more or less sophisticated technologies, basically according to the application need.
The strong need to have surveillance systems more and more intelligent has re-
sulted in a new generation of sensors, smart sensors.
The fundamental diﬀerence between a traditional sensor and smart sensor is the
latter's ﬂexible communication and information processing capability. Each sen-
sor has an on-board microprocessor that can be used for digital signal processing,
self-identiﬁcation, self-adaptation and self-diagnostics functions. Furthermore, all
smart sensor platforms use wireless communication technology [38]. Actually,
in the last years, the scientiﬁc community distinguishes between the concepts of
"smart" and "intelligent", pointing out that the former is related to technological
aspects while the latter to functional ones [39].
Thanks to the technological progress in the miniaturization techniques, the size of
sensors has decreased over time as well as their costs. This allowed to build more
complex systems for disparate applications able to implement eﬀective protection
strategies. Thus, modern surveillance systems integrate heterogeneous security
systems equipped with smart sensors. In the following, the most relevant systems
in security ﬁeld are presented.
1.3.1.1 Video Surveillance
Cameras are the most widespread devices in the surveillance ﬁeld and their level
of maturity is getting higher both in indoor and outdoor applications. Monitor-
ing through video streams of a Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) system allows a
quick recognition of a situation in order to prevent or detect possible malevolent
intents, as well as to conduct post incident analysis. The main characteristics of a
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camera are type of acquisition (color, thermal or infrared), resolution (standard or
megapixel), ﬁeld of view (ﬁxed or variable), physical transmission interface (wired
or wireless), and signal processing technology (analog or digital).
Video surveillance is a ﬁeld whose development keeps abreast of technology evolu-
tion. Indeed, cameras are equipped more and more with special features and often
the CCTV system is combined with a Video Content Analysis (VCA) system.
VCA is the capability of automatically analyzing video to detect and determine
temporal and spatial events. This technical capability is used in a wide range of
domains including transport, safety, security, health-care, retail, automotive, home
automation and entertainment. Many diﬀerent functionalities, more or less com-
plex, can be implemented in VCA. Relating to the complexity of the algorithm, it
can be hosted on the camera (using on board processing units) or on a dedicated
server. Table 1.1 lists some features of interest for security.
Functionality Description
Motion detection It allows to detect the motion of an object within
a video stream
Object Tracking The feature allows to follow the path of an object
within one or more video streams
Facial recognition It is a biometric application for automatically iden-
tifying or verifying a person from a video source
Line crossing It allows to deﬁne sensible areas (also virtual) and
generates an alarm when something is crossing
boundaries
Unattended object The objective is to warn in case of unattended ob-
jects like baggage in order to prevent bomb attacks
Overcrowding It determines the people density in a given area
that is a key parameter in the decisions process
related to crisis situations
Table 1.1: VCA features for security
Despite the continuous enhancement in this ﬁeld, VCA still presents several limits.
Their eﬀectiveness may be reduced by multiple factors such as the diﬃculty of mod-
eling complex behaviors (i.e. isolating individual people in crowds is hard [40]),
the sensitivity to changes of lighting conditions, the presence of reﬂective surfaces
in the scene, etc. In addition, VCA is often topic of debate for ethical issues (e.g.
facial recognition in public transportation is not allowed in all countries).
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1.3.1.2 Intrusion Detection and Access Control
Intrusion detection and access control belong to two diverse typology of systems
but are closely connected between them.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) groups several devices able to detect unautho-
rized access of people into sensible areas. It involves magnetic contacts, volumetric
sensors, glass break detectors, etc. However, in order to diﬀerentiate the accesses
unauthorized from the authorized ones an Access Control System (ACS) is re-
quired. ACS is based on three main concepts: possess (e.g. a card), knowledge
(e.g a pin) and biometric feature (e.g ﬁngerprint).
According to the required protection level or the permit level assigned, ACS can
manage more combinations of entry to or exit from secured areas. ACS is con-
stantly incorporating improvements in communications and security technologies;
nevertheless, each technology has a certain level of vulnerability to be considered.
For this reason, hybrid approaches which combine technologies based on the three
concepts above are preferred.
1.3.1.3 Audio Surveillance
An emergent security solution is the audio surveillance. By combining audio sen-
sors with advanced algorithms, this kind of technological tool is able to recognize
automatically abnormal or unexpected noises such as scream, glass breaks, explo-
sions, and shots.
This security system is particularly useful in situations of inadequate or absent
visibility; in this case, the sound constitutes an essential information source for
discriminating between suspicious events. In addition, this approach is especially
advantageous if compared to other systems (e.g VCA systems) since it is indepen-
dent from lighting conditions and it has low computational needs.
In contrast, their eﬀectiveness decreases in areas where the noise is very high. De-
spite of this, adopting adaptive frameworks is possible to detect atypical situations
under adverse conditions containing highly nonstationary background noise (e.g
see [41]).
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1.3.1.4 CBRNe Sensors
CBRNe systems are a good security solution for environmental monitoring and are
very speciﬁc technologies for particular threats. CBRNe is the term for protective
measures taken against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive
attacks. So, it is clear they constitute a powerful countermeasure against attacks
where weapons of mass destruction are expected.
This technology allows an eﬀective identiﬁcation of bombs, drugs, metallic and
nonmetallic weapons and explosives at long distance. Actually, unlike to radio-
logical and explosive sensors, chemical ones have still some problems about the
coverage range. For overcoming this restriction, often these tools dedicated to
explosive detection are combined with the deployment of dog patrols [42]. Un-
fortunately, the cost of this technology is rather high so it is essential to balance
the security needs with budgetary constraints. In practice, this limits the number
of checkpoints for dangerous substances detection; thus, their locations must be
evaluated accurately. Furthermore, the current solutions for CBRNE for people
scanning are not directly suitable to all situation due to their excessive processing
time (let consider the mass-transit system where this is not compatible with the
crowd ﬂows) [43].
1.3.2 PSIM Systems
Given the proliferation of the variety of interconnected systems, the willingness
to develop an open system architecture with the backdrop of interoperability,
and driven from needs to include other value-added functionality, PSIM solutions
have been developed. Born initially as a physical security integration enhance-
ment, PSIM is rapidly evolving to encompass information management systems
insomuch as it draws the attention of government agencies and businesses from a
wide range of markets [44].
It is a software platform that collects, correlates and manages information from
disparate security devices and information systems into one common situation pic-
ture in order to empower personnel to identify and proactively resolve situations.
The key element is its ability to integrate diﬀerent complex subsystems easily, as
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well as its interoperability with third-party applications and legacy security sys-
tems without being locked-in to any speciﬁc vendor. Many security beneﬁts hail
from adoption of PSIM solutions, like better situation awareness, decrease of reac-
tion times to events, driven management of the procedural actions in case of crisis
situations, support to post event analysis, etc. For this reason, they are assuming
a strategic role for properly responding to any kind of emergency and are essential
to respond and deal with the wide range of potential security risks. In detail,
in order to provide a complete Situation Assessment and Situation Management
this new generation of systems should fulﬁll ﬁve key capabilities [45] shown in
ﬁgure 1.3:
Figure 1.3: Key capabilities of a PSIM system [1]
1. Gathering: the system gathers data from a wide range of disparate devices
and subsystems;
2. Analysis: the gathered data should be analyzed in order to recognize the
situation and to give the right priority to a possible emergency;
3. Conﬁrmation: the system shows the situation to the security operator in a
clear and concise way enabling an accurate and quick conﬁrmation of the
appeared alarms;
4. Resolution: the PSIM system should clearly present to the security operator
the steps of the procedure to carry out for managing the situation in real
time;
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5. Reporting: all activities should be recorded for supporting the post-event
investigative analysis.
PSIM is analogous to SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) soft-
ware. Basically, it does for physical security what SIEM does for cyber security,
simplifying the surveillance activities, while improving security and reducing time,
cost and eﬀort that physical security requires [46].
1.4 Railway Domain
Railroads and mass-transit systems are critical transportation assets and are inte-
gral to the economy and welfare of the nations. They are able to connect diﬀerent
cities or diﬀerent areas of a city providing not only the passenger transport but
also the freight transport.
Passenger rail service, especially the commuter and underground ones, concen-
trates large numbers of people on trains and their location in the urban envi-
ronment oﬀers the attacker easy access to the train to launch an attack, with
multiple escape routes that allow them to blend into the surrounding population
after the attack has been completed. In addition, the railroads also carefully serve
the movement of hazardous freight daily. Movement of hazardous materials not
only represents a potential for signiﬁcant negative consequences to the community
and environments through which they are moved, but can cause serious economic
damages to the railroads in case of accidental or deliberate release. In particular,
railroad infrastructure is grown in the course of time in term of sizes, capabilities
and service oﬀering. Just to give an idea, Figure 1.4 shows the Istat data (kilome-
ters of railway network per 100 km2 of area) related to the overall railway and the
electriﬁed double-track network in the EU member states in 2014. On one hand
this has contributed to the onset of new and unexpected vulnerabilities and on
the other hand this has made the consequences potentially more serious in case of
attacks. At the same time, they are often the target of criminal and vandalistic
actions.
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Figure 1.4: Railway network in EU countries in 2014 [2].
Following September 11th, 2001 and the Madrid (March 11th, 2004) and London
(July 7th and 21st, 2005) terrorist attacks, the authorities operating in the trans-
portation sector have increasingly intensiﬁed the eﬀorts for improving security and
an increasing number of studies and research work have been performed in this
domain. Several EU Research actions have already been carried out or are in
progress allowing clarifying the background and potential proposals for actions in
the area of transportation security. The following are examples of FP7 projects:
• The COUNTERACT project [47], completed in March 2009, was set up to
improve security against terrorist attacks aimed at public passenger trans-
port, inter-modal freight transport, production of energy and transmission
infrastructure. This project focused on the protection of critical transport
infrastructures, public transport passengers and goods.
• The MODSAFE project [48], completed at in August 2012, has addressed
the harmonization of safety requirements, models, roles and certiﬁcation
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schemes in the European Urban Guided Transport sector. It have also ad-
dressed security requirements in their relations to the global safety objective
of the project, like ensuring the protection of persons and the system from
criminal acts.
• The DEMASST project [49], ended in May 2010, aimed to provide a
roadmap for the development and integration of System-of-Systems solu-
tions. It provided a structured approach on identifying the main security
gaps and the most promising integrated solutions, using suﬃciently mature
technologies, for ﬁlling them.
• The PROTECTRAIL project [50] ended in May 2014, whose objective was
to integrate the growing inﬂux of security technologies into rail operations
and make them interoperable to improve security.
• The SecureStation project [51] ran from June 2011 until May 2014, dealt
with the passenger station and terminal resilience to terrorist attacks and
safety incidents through technologies and methodologies enabling design to
reduce the impact of blast, ﬁre and the dispersion of toxic agents on passen-
gers, staﬀ and infrastructure.
Although the rail industry and government have taken signiﬁcant steps to enhance
rail network security further improvements are still necessary. In this scenario, all
the actors in charge of such infrastructures share a common mission: to guarantee
an accessible and ﬂexible service which is reliable and secure at the same time.
At this aim, adopting adequate methodologies of analysis, design strategies, and
technologies is the cornerstone of the protection.
The railway system needs to be equipped with complex and integrated protec-
tion systems, to avoid criminal attacks and/or to reduce their impact. Innova-
tive systems in security surveillance integrate heterogeneous sensors [52, 53]; the
events should be correlated [54] in order to increase the reliability of these tech-
nologies, avoiding the generation of unnecessary warnings and better supporting
decisions [55].
Also such protection systems need to be adequately designed since the prelimi-
nary phases of the life cycle in order to obtain the best trade-oﬀ between costs
and eﬀective protection. This implies an accurate assessment through apposite
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methodologies able to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of protection systems. In this
perspective, both quantitative and qualitative methodologies can be used. For ex-
ample, in [56] a qualitative methods are used for assessing terrorism risk in railway
domain. The method is based on threat that is how terrorists have attacked in the
past and the many diﬀerent ways in which they might attack in the future. On the
contrary, Sapori at al. [57] proposes the implementation of risk-based methodolo-
gies in use by process engineering to achieve a quantitative assessment of security
management systems and applies it to railway context. The ﬁrst steps show how
to analyze the system and how to integrate technological, human and procedural
aspects by ﬂow charts. The next steps describe how to manage threats, vulnerabil-
ity and criticality of CI subsystems and how to identify causes and consequences
through fault trees and event trees, and ﬁnally how to calculate the residual risk
for security management system.
1.5 Thesis Contribution
The original contribution of this thesis is to provide methods for enhancing ef-
fectiveness and reliability of integrated security systems in order to guarantee an
adequate protection level. To achieve the desired level of protection, a two phase
approach is proposed combining proactive and reactive strategies. The ﬁrst in-
volves a vulnerability assessment of a PPS based on quantitative methods while
the second introduces an interoperability framework for improving reaction to at-
tacks. The overall approach will be applicable to the design phase of a PPS as well
as to the evaluation phase of an existing PPS in order to determine the changes
to be made for achieving the desired level of security. The pivotal points on which
this thesis is founded are mainly two:
• deﬁning and developing an interoperability framework for improving eﬀec-
tiveness and ﬂexibility of a PSIM system;
• deﬁning a methodology for evaluating vulnerabilities of a PPS system.
These are two complementary approaches that converge towards the same objec-
tive. The ﬁrst approach provides a tool for integrating and making interoperable
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diﬀerent security systems and security management systems in order to counteract
the attacks. However, hardening of all potential targets against all possible forms
of attack is cost prohibitive. For this reason, the second approach aims to as-
sign conﬁdence levels to protection of assets derived from an accurate quantitative
evaluation of vulnerability of the PPS.

Chapter 2
A Model-Driven Approach to
Vulnerability Evaluation
As said in the section 1.2.2, a PPS involves systems, procedures and people for
protecting assets and facilities from malevolent human attacks. The need to have
an interoperability context interconnecting heterogeneous monitoring systems, se-
curity systems and security operators, has conducted towards the adoption of
new category of management systems known as PSIM. Such systems collect and
correlate events from security devices and information systems enabling situation
awareness and management reporting. Nevertheless, eﬀective protection calls for
the availability of proper methodologies and tools to evaluate the vulnerability of
critical assets and the ability of the adopted protection system to meet its ob-
jectives. In the context of security information management, the vulnerability is
often deﬁned as a weakness that can be exploited by a threat. This deﬁnition is
widely used in risk assessment methodologies designed to be qualitative and based
on the work of skilled security analysts. In fact, vulnerability is commonly quali-
tatively evaluated, also relying on the availability of historical data related to past
threat events. On the contrary, eﬀective protection needs to an accurate quanti-
tative evaluation of vulnerability able to produce scientiﬁc and rigorous measures.
In the ﬁeld of physical security few eﬀorts have been made to the development
of approaches for the quantitative analysis of vulnerability. The objective of this
chapter is to propose a model-driven approach in order to evaluate quantitatively
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the vulnerability of CIs through the eﬀectiveness evaluation of the whole PPS.
In particular, the proposed methodology is based on a MDE approach that con-
siders the three aspects of the matter of interest: infrastructure, attack, and pro-
tection. Hence, this modeling approach evaluates the vulnerability of an asset
with respect to the threats and speciﬁc protection systems applied. The approach
deﬁnes a UML proﬁle for Vulnerability Analysis and Modeling for Critical Infras-
tructure Protection (CIP_VAM) and the automated generation of quantitative
vulnerability models from UML annotated artifacts.
2.1 Aims, Scope and Hypotheses
This work contemplates security aspects of CIs considering situations where the
perpetrators exploit vulnerable elements of the civilian infrastructure for the pur-
pose of indiscriminate murder or criminal activities.
Vulnerabilities may be associated with physical (e.g., a broken fence), cyber (e.g.,
lack of a ﬁrewall), or human (e.g., untrained guards) factors. For this reason,
security of critical infrastructures is often considered a multi-faceted and multi-
disciplinary problem that requires an integrated approach [5860]. Nevertheless,
as outlined in the chapter 1, this work considers the concerns of security tied to
physical and human factors without considering those related to the cyber ones.
In the physical security ﬁeld, the vulnerabilities identiﬁcation and evaluation are
necessary activities in order to restrict as possible as the consequences originat-
ing from voluntary actions. Nevertheless, these are diﬃcult tasks that must be
adapted to the application domain and the current needs of the organizations. The
environment of the critical infrastructures is strongly distributed in the space and
the eﬀect of this is to have likely weaknesses distributed along the whole system1.
In eﬀect, a vulnerability is a weak spot that might be exploited to launch an attack
and accordingly it is strictly related to the capacity of counteract threats that take
place in that moment. Furthermore, not all weakness aﬀect the system's vulner-
ability equally and so each of them contributes to it in a diﬀerent measure. This
measure reﬂects the likelihood of the weakness of being exploited during attacks.
1when we refer to 'system' we tend to mean the infrastructure with the protection systems
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To be more precise we can consider the vulnerability as speciﬁc to an asset due
to the its attractiveness from an attacker's point of view, physically distributed
and aﬀected by circumstances also seemingly independent, and variable because
it changes and spreads in the course of the time according to what happens. In
particular, for a given asset the variability of vulnerability is due not only to the
typology of attack and the set of protection systems used, but also to the actions
undertaken to contain propagation of the eﬀects. Vulnerabilities to a speciﬁc at-
tack are indications of the practicality of an attack, assuming security measures
are in place.
There have been few attempts to combine more factors that contribute to vulnera-
bility. This investigation aims at propose a comprehensive approach that includes
environmental, physical, human, and organizational variables in addition to op-
erational measurements of protection components which can help to enhance the
understanding of vulnerability regarding to the main threats. The assessment of
overall vulnerability requires the consideration of all protective interventions, both
active and passive.
Speciﬁcally, the focus is on quantitative methods since they allow to obtain a
measure for evaluating the protection of an asset in a more rigorous way and then
how notable is the risk in case of attacks considering the applied choices. Hence,
here the deﬁnition introduced by Lewis in [19] is adopted, where vulnerability is
the conditional probability that the asset is damaged, given that an attack or
incident occurs(see the formula 1.2 in the section 1.2.1).
2.2 Background
2.2.1 The METRIP project
METRIP2 was an European project under the Programme Prevention, Prepared-
ness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related Risks
2http://metrip.unicampus.it/
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coordinated by AnsaldoSTS. Its general objective was the development of method-
ological tools for increasing the physical protection of railway infrastructure sys-
tems with a focus on urban mass transportation. At this aim, METRIP deﬁned
a decision making system for supporting the design and evaluation of physical
protection systems. The decision making system is intended to: (i) suggest the
types and disposition of devices that maximize protection eﬀectiveness; and (ii)
help evaluate the eﬀectiveness of a given PPS against attacks. The approach
adopted within the METRIP project combines Model-Driven Engineering (MDE)
techniques, optimization models and formal quantitative models to carry out a vul-
nerability analysis of the critical assets of a Railway Infrastructure System (RIS)
against various classes of attacks, and evaluate diﬀerent solutions in the design of
protection systems.
2.2.2 Model-Driven Engineering
Model-driven engineering (MDE) is a software development methodology which
focuses on creating and exploiting domain models (they are representations of
knowledge and activities that govern a particular application domain), rather than
on the computing (i.e. algorithmic) concepts. MDE is a promising approach to
address platform complexity and the inability of third-generation languages to
alleviate this complexity and express domain concepts eﬀectively combining the
following [61]:
• Domain Speciﬁc Modeling Languages (DSML)s whose type systems formal-
ize the application structure, behavior, and requirements within particular
domains. DSMLs are described using metamodels, which deﬁne the relation-
ships among concepts in a given domain, specifying the key semantics and
constraints associated with these domain concepts. In this way, for build-
ing applications, developers use the elements captured by metamodels and
express design intent declaratively rather than imperatively.
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• Transformation engines and generators that analyze certain aspects of mod-
els and then synthesize various types of artifacts, such as source code, simu-
lation inputs, XML deployment descriptions or alternative model represen-
tations. The ability to synthesize artifacts from models helps ensure the
consistency between application and analysis information associated with
functional requirements captured by models.
So, MDE focuses on developing domain models and it is very appealing in indus-
trial settings. It allows for a high level of abstraction as well as the deﬁnition
of modeling paradigms that are eﬀective from the modeller's point of view, since
they are based on the domain knowledge.
DSML and UML proﬁles
DSMLs are small and well focused on domain scope, they simplify the design
process, tracing recurring design patterns in the application domain, and promote
communication by standardizing the terminology and the best practices to be used
in the speciﬁc application domain. A key category of support for domain-speciﬁc
modeling is represented by UML proﬁles. UML proﬁling is actually a lightweight
meta-modeling technique to extend UML [62]. It is a powerful mean to deﬁne
DSMLs [63] which exploits two main advantages within a Model-Driven Engineer-
ing context with respect to the development of ad-hoc DSMLs: i) a UML proﬁle
is eﬀective from the modeler's perspective, as it captures and easily replicates
the modeler's architectural knowledge of a speciﬁc domain at diﬀerent levels; ii)
a UML proﬁle allows for the adoption of available and standard techniques and
tools which maybe easily integrated into existing production systems. In addition,
the usage of a modeling language based on few and well speciﬁed domain-related
concepts supports the deﬁnition of model transformations so allowing the devel-
opment of a complete model-driven design methodology. A UML Proﬁle is just
an extension of the UML, deﬁned in terms of stereotypes or concepts in the target
domain that will be added to UML and tags, the attributes of the stereotypes.
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Transformation
The transformational approach is based on: a) deﬁnition of a set of proper trans-
formation rules to map the high level conceptual languages to the formal languages
used for quantitative modeling or to the input data format of solving tools; b) im-
plementation of the transformations which translate the conceptual models into
quantitative models or other artifacts needed for decision support. The transfor-
mations can be classiﬁed in Model-to-Model (M2M) and Model-to-Text (M2T)
transformations. The ﬁrst category aims at transforming the model in an other
model, expressed for example in a diﬀerent formalism. The main reason of their
usage is that the new model may enable analysis that are not feasible in the previ-
ous formalism. This approach are widely used in this thesis. The second category
is typically performed by queries in order to obtain from the model some tex-
tual information. For example, this can be useful when structured data must be
extracted to perform the processing with other software tools.
2.2.3 Bayesian Networks
Bayesian Networks (BNs) [64, 65], also known as belief networks, provide a graph-
ical representation of a joint probability distribution over a set of random variables
with a possible mutual causal relationship. The network is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) whose nodes represent random variables and arcs represent casual inﬂu-
ences between pair of nodes (i.e., an arc stands for a probabilistic dependence
between two random variables). In addition to the DAG structure, which is often
considered as the qualitative part of the model, one needs to specify the quan-
titative parameters of the model [66]. The parameters are described through a
conditional probability distribution which is deﬁned for each node in the network.
For discrete random variables, this conditional probability is often represented by
a table (conditional probability table, CPT). Hence, the CPT gives the probability
of each value of a child node given every possible combination of values for its par-
ents. A prior probability should be provided for the source nodes of the DAG as
they have no parents. Founded on the Bayes theorem, a BN provides a means to
evaluate all possible inference queries, where the probabilities does not understand
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as frequencies but rather as conﬁdence levels in the case an event occurs. In this
way, it is possible to provide a predictive support for a node, based on evidence
nodes connected to it through its parent nodes.
2.3 Vulnerability Evaluation Process
According to MDE principles, the vulnerability evaluation process encompasses
three main directions: models, automation and quantitative analysis.
Models are used at diﬀerent points of the design and evaluation approach, and
they play diﬀerent roles in the assessment process according to the two phase in
which they are used:
• UML models are used to represent the critical assets, protection measures
and attack scenarios. These models contain the information needed to spec-
ify the target system, the components of the integrated security systems and
the steps of the adversary's attack. They are the inputs for the vulnerability
analysis phase.
• Quantitative (probabilistic) models are used to evaluate the vulnerability of
a critical asset equipped with protection facilities against a speciﬁed attack.
This modeling phase is automated on the basis of the structure and the
information contained in the UML speciﬁcation (including a representation
of the attack scenario).
Automation consists in automated generation of the quantitative models for the
vulnerability analysis. This is accomplished thanks to the model transformation
which represents the heart of the model-driven process; an useful taxonomy may
be found in [67]. Several approaches are developed in the last decade and the
major categories are described in [68] and [69]. Although in literature many works
address automatic model transformation in order to achieve diﬀerent investigation
(some of these concern the railway domain, e.g. for safety analysis and veriﬁ-
cation of a railway interlocking system [70] and for veriﬁcation of train control
system speciﬁcation [71]), comparable approaches having as target model those
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for vulnerability analysis seem not to be there. In the physical security ﬁeld, the
vulnerability analysis is a necessary activity concerning with the problem of iden-
tifying weaknesses in order to restrict as possible as the consequences originating
from voluntary actions. As discussed in the paragraph 1.2 either quantitative or
qualitative methods can be used for vulnerability analysis. This work focuses on
quantitative methods since they allow to obtain a measure for evaluating the pro-
tection of an asset in a more rigorous way and then how notable is the risk in
case of attacks considering the applied choices. A quantitative notion of vulnera-
bility is used and commonly deﬁned as the likelihood that an attack is successful,
given that it is attempted [19]. In this direction, practical applications for vul-
nerability analysis use statistical approaches and mathematical modeling (see for
example [72] and [73]), stochastic models (e.g. in [74]), Bayesian Networks have
been also used, both for cyber-security analysis [75] and for vulnerability evalua-
tion [29] in physical protection applications.
Figure 2.1: The vulnerability evaluation process
A schema of the overall approach is showed in Figure 2.1. An user, such as security
designer or analyst, builds UML models that are the inputs of the process. This
speciﬁcation is annotated with the stereotypes and tagged values of the CIP_VAM
proﬁle and contains all the information needed to analysis (e.g., the concrete values
of the parameters required to fully describe a speciﬁc infrastructure, or a speciﬁc
protection device, or a given attack scenario). These models are the inputs for the
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transformation that builds the quantitative model automatically. This requires the
deﬁnition of a Model-to-Model (M2M) transformation which produce target model
from UML models. The target model is given back to the user which analyzes it
in order to perform the vulnerability evaluation.
2.4 CIP_VAM Language
The CIP_VAM language is a DSML conceived within the European project METRIP
to support the design and evaluation activities of physical protection systems. Al-
though born for addressing the issue of the protection of a Railway Infrastructure
System (RIS), their concepts are intentionally general so that they are applicable
to any critical infrastructure.
CIP_VAM is a light-weight UML extension and may be used to derive a quantita-
tive model for vulnerability evaluation, as well as to generate proper input to de-
cisional tools in order to calculate the optimal location of security devices [76, 77].
The literature supplies a wide selection of papers about using UML proﬁles like
MARTE [78] (Modeling and Analysis of Real-Time and Embedded Systems),
UMLsec [79] (allows to specify security information during the development of
security-critical systems and provides tool-support for formal security veriﬁca-
tion), RCDS [80] (a domain speciﬁc modeling language for railway and tramway
control systems that covers the segments of the rail network, sensors, and control
elements like signals and switches), and so on, but it is lacking regarding UML
proﬁles for modeling critical infrastructure protection. In [81] the UML-CI proﬁle
is presented that deals with modelling of critical infrastructures. It consider the
management aspects of a CI even if, given the publishing year of last reference
found, it does not appear carry on.
The ultimate goal of the CIP_VAM language is to oﬀer a comprehensive modelling
of physical protection issues during design phases of integrated security systems.
Among the found proﬁles, SecAM [82] is what which mainly comes close to this
approach also for a possible integration of the cyber security aspects. It is a recent
work that enables the modelling and security speciﬁcation for critical infrastruc-
tures during the early phases (requirements, design) of system development life
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cycle. The original contribution of CIP_VAM is to correlate both infrastructure
and attack with the protection, applied to defend the assets.
A ﬁrst deﬁnition of this language was given in [83] where the protection was consid-
ered in its simplest form, by providing the possibility of representing the presence
of protection equipment, including technical features and localization data, and
excluding the combined usage of diﬀerent devices and the eﬀects produced by a
real integration which comes from using PSIM systems. For this reason further ex-
tensions have been introduced by revisiting the concepts in the Protection package.
In this thesis the last version of the CIP_VAM language is presented.
With the aim to provide a clear characterization of the application domain, a
conceptual model was deﬁned in order to identify all the needed concepts and
relations. Once the conceptual model was completed, it have been mapped into a
UML proﬁle, by identifying for each domain concept the most suitable UML nota-
tion. The next subsections will describe the domain model and the corresponding
proﬁle.
2.4.1 CIP_VAM Domain Model
The CIP_VAM domain model is represented by a set of UML Class Diagrams,
structured into three main packages, which provide a comprehensive view of both
the system and threats to analyze (Fig. 2.2).
Figure 2.2: CIP_VAM domain model
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The system consists of a physical infrastructure (whose elements may be consid-
ered assets to protect) and the protection system to assess or to design. Hence,
the three packages included in the CIP_VAM domain model are:
• Infrastructure, which includes all the concepts necessary to describe the phys-
ical elements of the infrastructure, and contains both asset and environmen-
tal related concepts;
• Attack, which individuates concepts related to threat and attack events con-
ducted against the assets within the infrastructure;
• Protection, which introduces protection related concepts and provides a de-
scription of techniques and countermeasures which may be applied to defend
the assets. Actually, the protection of a critical infrastructure is an elabo-
rate task requiring the joint set of interoperable systems, procedures and
people. For including the combined usage of diﬀerent devices and the eﬀects
produced by a real integration which comes from using PSIM systems, the
protection package is in turn organized into three sub-packages:
 Common acts like a bridge between the Protection model and the con-
cepts introduced by the Infrastructure and Attack packages.
 Equipment introduces diﬀerent domain classes representing protection
items or devices that can be deployed;
 Management contains the concepts related to security procedures and
the actions which are undertaken after the occurrence of an event (e.g.,
an alarm) raised by a protection equipment.
As the target of an attack is always an asset and a protection is used to protect
the asset to a speciﬁc asset against one or more attacks classes, dependencies exist
between the Attack package and the Infrastructure package, as well as between the
Protection package and the Infrastructure and Attack packages. The Equipment
and Management packages are closely dependent (through the Common pack-
age), these dependencies enable the possibility to model the eﬀective integration
of several protection devices as well as devices and procedures.
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The remainder of this paragraph will provide a description of the CIP_VAM
domain model, describing the elements belonging to three packages.
Infrastructure Package
The main concepts of the Infrastructure package are Site, Interface, Object and
Service (Fig. 2.3). A physical infrastructure consists of a number of sites which
may contain one or more subSites (e.g., corridors, rooms, functional areas, etc.).
Objects may be located into Sites and may be composed by subObjects, they may
also provide or request services, which in turn may be implemented through sub-
Services. Diﬀerent Sites may share interfaces (e.g., windows, doors, gratings, etc.).
Asset is a concept that may be related to any element whose loss or disruption
cause an economic loss. An Asset is characterized by its economic value, vulner-
ability, occurrence probability of an attack against it (attackProb), quantitative
and qualitative estimate of potential or unwanted outcome (risk and riskLevel).
Figure 2.3: CIP_VAM domain model: infrastructure
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Attack Package
The Attack package (Fig. 2.4) models the oﬀensive operation (Attack) conducted
by an Attacker against an asset according to the adopted tactic (nature of the at-
tack: kidnapping, armed attack, sabotage, etc.). An attack may be be decomposed
into a sequence of steps (Actions). Each action of the attack may be performed
by using one (or more) Weapons and it has a failure probability (failure), in ad-
dition it may be triggered by a Trigger event. The Threat association models the
eﬀect that the attack wants to cause on the asset. Both attack and action can be
characterized over time by a temporal duration. The Impairment class models the
consequence of the attack actions on the asset. When an attack action aﬀects an
asset, then the damage may propagate and cause further damages with a given
probability and under speciﬁc conditions.
Figure 2.4: CIP_VAM domain model: attack
Protection Package
The Protection model (Fig. 2.5) concerns equipment, personnel and procedures
involved in defending assets from attacks.
The Common package introduces the general concept of protection and the main
relationships with Attack and Infrastructure ones. Protection is an abstract class
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modelling a generic protection/defence mechanism: it is characterized by a cost
and by the probability to be eﬀective against an attack (succesProb). The as-
sociation protection links a protection to the asset it protects (Asset class from
the Infrastructure package). In addition, the associations mandatory and forbid-
den allow for specifying if a protection must/mustn't be applied to an asset (e.g.,
in some cases the privacy norms may forbid the usage of speciﬁc equipments, as
cameras or CCTV systems).
From the point of view of the Equipment package, the abstract concept Protection
is specialized by the Equipment class, characterized by the attributes failureRate
(failure probability) and nature. In turn Equipment is further specialized by sev-
eral classes representing distinct kinds of security devices, (Barrier, Sensor, and
Deterrent) some of which were already present in the model described in Sec-
tion 2.4, some others have been added with an increased level of detail. Sensor
will be extensively used in the applications described in this paper. It may repre-
sent several kinds of devices such as CBRNe, microphones, bomb sniﬀer and so on.
It adds information about the range of the sensor, its false positive and false neg-
ative rates (fpr and fnr attributes), the sensing latency and its data transmission
technology (transData). Hence, Sensor represents a wide spectrum of technology
instruments and it is specialized by the Camera class in order to meet speciﬁc
needs. Every camera is characterized by a given resolution and processing tech-
nique (analogical or digital). To take into account the possibility of using cameras
capable of remote directional and zoom control, the Camera class has been further
specialized by the Ptz class which allows to set typical technical parameters of a
pan-tilt-zoom camera, as angular speed, range and zoom. An Equipment may
be applied (through an InstallationPoint) to a Site, an Interface, an Object or a
Service in order to defend an asset. InstallationPoint also speciﬁes the position
and the direction of the equipment installation.
The Management package introduces the concepts related to defense that is the
countermeasures triggered by an attack. The abstract class Protection is special-
ized in this package by three classes: Protocol, Operator and ManagementSystem.
In particular, the latter represents a management system that integrates multiples
and diﬀerent protection systems. So, an aggregation relation exists between Man-
agementSystem and Protection. Operator represents a generic operator, human
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or mechanical. An Operator is not tied to a speciﬁc location but may change its
position if it is necessary. Finally, Protocol allows to combine the eﬀects originat-
ing from the integration of subsystems and people when an event is raised by a
Protection system. In particular, it models a generic procedure that is triggered
by a generic Protection system and it is composed by a sequence of steps (Proto-
colRule), each one representing a speciﬁc action. The latter describes the actions
executed by one or more Operators with the eventual support of a Protection.
2.4.2 CIP_VAM Proﬁle
In this section the mapping from the conceptual domain model to a concrete
UML proﬁle is described. The CIP_VAM UML proﬁle has been built in a sys-
tematic way following rules described in [84]; concepts from the domain model are
mapped to stereotypes and tagged-values. Fig. 2.6 shows a general overview of
the CIP_VAM proﬁle which includes a set of UML extensions and a Library.
CIP_VAM Library.
The CIP_VAM_Library (detailed in Fig. 2.7) imports some packages of the ex-
isting library from the OMG MARTE proﬁle [78] and deﬁnes some speciﬁc basic,
geometric and structured data types. The CIP VAM Library is composed as fol-
lowing: a set of enumerations are deﬁned in BasicDT (Figure 2.7(a)); the geometric
data types in GeometricDT are necessary in order to model physical structures
and spaces (Figure 2.7(b)); the Structure package deﬁnes complex data types by
means of aggregation of BasicDT and GeometricDT types (Figure 2.7(c)). Both
GeometricDT and StructuredDT use some types deﬁned in the MARTE Library.
The meaning of each element of the CIP_VAM Library may be found in Ap-
pendix A.
CIP_VAM Extensions.
The CIP_VAM extensions packages is illustrated in Fig. 2.8. The extensions are
organized into three main packages whose structure is the same of the domain
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(a) Common
(b) Equipment
(c) Management
Figure 2.5: CIP_VAM domain model: protection
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<<modelLibrary>>
CIP_VAM::CIP_VAM_Library
BasicDT GeometricDT
StructuredDT
<<modelLibrary>>
MARTE::MARTE_Library
<<profile>>
CIP_VAM
<<modelLibrary>>
CIP_VAM::CIP_VAM_Library
<<profile>>
CIP_VAM::CIP_VAM_UML_extensions
Infrastructure Attack
Protection
<<modelLibrary>>
MARTE::MARTE_Library
<<import>>
<<import...
<<import>>
<<import...
<<import...
Figure 2.6: CIP_VAM UML proﬁle: overview.
model. The relevant stereotypes and tags, to the vulnerability analysis are intro-
duced and described here below.
The stereotypes introduced to model the Infrastructure have been reported in
Figure 2.8(a). The three main stereotypes are: Site, Object and Interface.
Site shall be applied on all modeling elements which represent physical (or
logical) areas in which the system under analysis can be decomposed (e.g. control
rooms, waiting rooms, platforms, etc.). Interfaces join more sites, examples are
doors, windows, balconies as they join two sites (speciﬁed by the exposures tag).
Objects can be located in a site, or it may be considered on its own if no sites
are speciﬁed (in this case the tag location will not be assigned a value).
Site, Object and Interface are diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Item through
the Physical stereotype. Both Item and Physical are abstract stereotypes
(i.e., they are not directly applicable on modeling elements): they specify some
tags which model features shared by Sites, Objects and Interfaces. In
particular, they all may be assets. This is modeled by specifying a value for the
tag asset (see Item) which represents the weight of the asset according to several
indexes. Among them, the economic loss in case of destruction, damage or theft
of the asset. Hence, by deﬁnition, an asset has an economic price.
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(a) BasicDT
(b) GeometricDT
(c) StructuredDT
Figure 2.7: The CIP_VAM Library
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(a) Infrastructure
(b) Attack
(c) Protection
Figure 2.8: The CIP_VAM UML extension
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As for the Physical stereotype, its meaning is that, at the state, the entities we
deal with within the Infrastructure model are not virtual but concrete things.
They may have a shape and be 3D object (volume).
The hierarchy described above extends UML as the root stereotype Item extends
the UML meta-class Classiﬁer. This implies that its specialized stereotypes can
be applied on all the UML Classiﬁers (Classes, Associations, Components, etc.)
making it possible the usage of all the UML Classiﬁer modeling elements. For
example, nested sites can be modeled through a Component Diagram in which
Components can be nested or, similarly, the Interface stereotype could be applied
on Association because both Component and Association are UML Classiﬁers.
This deep specialization chain between stereotypes also enables future extensions
of the proﬁle.
The stereotypes introduced to model Attacks have been reported in Figure 2.8(b).
The main stereotypes in the Figure are: Attacker, Attack and Action. The
Attacker models the person or people which conduct an Attack against an
asset. It is possible to represent the attacker's capabilities through the ﬁrmness
and skill tags, while some features of the attack may be modeled using the tags
duration, tactic and threats. The Action stereotype is introduced to model the
steps of an attack. Details about each action may be expressed through its tags:
for example, weapon may be used to specify the kind of weapons used during a
speciﬁc attacker's action; occurrenceProb tag is the probability that the action is
performed.
Attacker, Attack and Action extend the UML meta-class Classiﬁer, too.
Nevertheless, further extensions could allow to model an attack by using also
diﬀerent UML modeling elements: Attack extends the UML meta-class UseCase
and Attacker extends the UML meta-class Actor allowing to reuse the UML
Use Case Diagram in modeling the structure of an attack. Finally, Action and
Attack extend the UML meta-class ActivityNode so enabling the insertion of
attack related concepts into the UML Activity Diagram.
Again, the stereotypes used to model Protection facilities have been reported in
Figure 2.8(c). Similarly to Item and Physical, the Protection stereotype
enables further extensions of the CIP_VAM proﬁle. Hence, its tags are general
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enough: cost, successProbability, and others. Again, Protection is specialized
by the stereotype Operator, ManagementSystem, Equipment, Protocol
and ProtocolRule.
The Equipment stereotype may be applied on modelling elements which repre-
sent protection devices or systems installed in a ﬁxed point (application) and it is
characterized by their nature and failureRate. It is specialized by three stereotypes
Sensor, Deterrent and Barrier. Speciﬁcally, the Sensor stereotype (e.g.
cameras, microphones, bomb sniﬀer, etc.) adds information about the range of
the sensor, its false positive and false negative rates (fpr and fnr tags) and the
sensing latency. In turn, Sensor can be further specialized for typology of device
(e.g. Camera).
The Equipment, Operator and ManagementSystem stereotypes extend the
Class and the Component UML metaclasses. The Protocol stereotype, instead,
extends the Activity UML metaclass, while the ProtocolRule extends the Ac-
tivityNode UML metaclass.
2.5 Deriving the Vulnerability Model
This section describes how to derive a vulnerability model based on Bayesian
Networks and how to automate its generation from a CIP_VAM annotated UML
model.
The transformation from CIP_VAM to BN is able to generate the structure of
the BN model which also catches information about the dependency relationships
among the three modeling levels (infrastructure, protection and attack). Estab-
lished the graph, for each node of the BN model a CTP has to be deduced allowing
quantitative analysis.
In order to obtain a consistent BN, some rules must be obeyed during the UML
modeling phase: a) attacks are represented by Use Cases, an Activity is associated
to each Use Case if its behavior has to be detailed, in this case the actions which
realize an attack are modeled by ActivityNodes; b) services are not considered in
this version of the transformations; c) protocols (i.e., the protection procedures)
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are represented by Activities where protocol rules are ActivityNodes; d) a BN
is a DAG, for this reason it is necessary that Activity Diagrams, representing
both attacks and protocols, do not contain cycles; e) it will be clear later that
some speciﬁc tags play an important role in establishing relationships between BN
nodes, consequently these tags must be set in the concrete UML models.
2.5.1 BN Structure
Before describing the transformation, the BN model to be built is presented. It
reﬂects the structure of the source UML model, i.e., it is organized into three
levels: infrastructure, attack and protection. Fig. 2.9 exempliﬁes this organization
and highlights the levels into which the nodes are divided.
Figure 2.9: General structure of BN
On the bottom level attacks are placed; each attack node (A1, A2, . . . , An nodes in
Fig. 2.9) represents a random variable associated to the occurrence of an attack
action, the arcs between these nodes specify the causal inﬂuences between attack
actions. Let them be node of type A; each A-node represents a random Boolean
variable where the value in each node represents the occurrence or the absence of
the related attack action.
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The protection level includes diﬀerent kinds of nodes since they model random
variables associated to diﬀerent classes of protection items (protection equipments,
operators and protocols). In Fig. 2.9 the generic node Pi represents the availabili-
ty/unavailability of a protection device (equipments and operators) involved in the
protection system. Each P -node is connected to one of the E-nodes: the truth of
an E-node says that the protection device successfully detects (infers, recognises,
depending on device) an attack action. Hence an E-node is also connected to one
or more A-nodes representing attack actions the protection may detect.
Each protection action of a protocol is associated to one pair of BN nodes: a PRA-
node and a PRE-node. The PRA-node models the activation of the protection
action, the PRE-node represents the execution of the same action. The relation-
ship between activation and execution is realised by an arc from the PRA to PRE
nodes. Arcs from the E-nodes to PRE-nodes model the causal inﬂuence between
on a protection action by both the operator who executes it and the protection
device which supports the action (if any). In addition, the PRA-node which is
associated to the ﬁrst action performed according to the protection protocol, is
connected to all the E-nodes corresponding to the protection devices which may
trigger the protocol.
At the top of the BN model of Fig. 2.9, the infrastructure level contains some I-
nodes representing a random Boolean variables whose truth means the associated
asset is protected by at least a protection item (equipment or protocol). The
I-nodes correspond to infrastructural UML elements tagged as Asset. An arc
between two I-nodes models the eﬀect that a successful attack, carried out against
a ﬁrst asset (the source BN node), may have on a second asset (the target BN
node). Finally, arcs from E-nodes (resp. PRE-nodes) to I-nodes model the causal
inﬂuence of a protection device (resp. a protection protocol) on the asset associated
to the I-node.
Summarizing, the set of nodes of the BN model are partitioned in the following
classes:
• A: nodes modeling actions of an attack;
• P : nodes modeling protection devices;
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• E: nodes modeling detection/recognition of attack actions by protection
devices;
• PRA: nodes modeling activation of protection actions belonging to a pro-
tection protocol;
• PRE: nodes modeling execution of protection actions belonging to a pro-
tection protocol;
• I: nodes modeling elements of the infrastructure.
2.5.2 Conditional Probability Table
Given the structure of the BN model, each BN node has a CPT where its structure
is related to the type of the node while the parameters are is ﬁlled instanced
with the tagged values deduced by the model. As showed in Fig. 2.10, we can
have two kinds of A-nodes: a root (A1) that corresponds to the ﬁrst step of an
attack sequence or an inner node (A2) that corresponds to a succeeding action.
The CPTs of the two nodes are reported: both of them are very simple and
represent the evidence of an attack step. This comes directly from the deﬁnition
of the vulnerability reported in the section 2.1. Since A1 is a root, the related
CPT corresponds to a prior probability which is the occurrence probability of the
starting event. Instead, the CPT of A2 describes conditional probability of the
node according to the previous step of the attack (in this case A1).
Figure 2.10: CPT for attack nodes
P -nodes are always root nodes: the CPT of a P -node considers the failure rate of
the device or the operator's availability (Fig. 2.11).
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Figure 2.11: CPT for protection nodes
The CPT of an E-node takes account of the detection probability of the related
protection (P -node) and the event of the attack (A-node) that triggers the detec-
tion. As showed in Fig. 2.12, given the attack (A = TRUE) the probability of
the eﬀect node is equal to 1-fnr where fnr is the false negative rate of the device
(a tagged value of the Sensor stereotype). To the contrary, if the attack there
is not (A=FALSE) we consider the false positive rate (fpr) of the protection. In
particular, Fig. 2.13 shows a CPT corresponding to the case where the eﬀect of
a protection is also conditioned by the eﬀect of an enabling protection. The ﬁrst
CPT results a special case of the second one when E2 is always true.
E
A P
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1-fnr fnrA,P=TRUE
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Figure 2.12: CPT for eﬀect nodes
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Figure 2.13: CPT for eﬀect nodes with dependency by protection
Fig. 2.14 and Fig. 2.15 show the CPTs for the PRA-nodes and PRE-nodes. Let
be E(T ), E(S) and E(E) the E-nodes representing the protections written re-
spectively in the triggeredBy, supportedBy and executedBy tagged values of the
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Protocol and ProtocolRule stereotypes. The CPTs implement an AND
logic resulting true if all the input nodes are true: this means that both the ac-
tivation and execution of a protocol and a protocol rule are strictly conditioned
by the combined eﬀect of the related protection measures. It is important to un-
derline that the PRA-node which plays the role of parents to the PRE-node is
related to the same ProtocolRule while the PRE-node which plays the role of
parents to the PRA-node refers to the previous protection procedure step.
Figure 2.14: CPT for activation nodes of a protocol
Figure 2.15: CPT for execution nodes of a protocol
Finally Fig. 2.16 shows the CPT of an I-node which can be aﬀected by the exe-
cution of a protocol rule (PRE), the eﬀect of a protection (E) and the contained
sites or objects (I1 and I2). The CPT is summarised by a Boolean function which
combines both the eﬀects of protection measures (PRE and E) and the protection
of its subcomponents (I1 and I2). These two kinds of contributions are logically
in AND since we consider the I protected only if all of its subcomponents are
protected and at least one of the protection measures reacts correctly.
2.5.3 Model Transformation
The transformation process is in charge of generating the vulnerability model
described above. The UML metamodel extended with CIP_VAM UML proﬁle is
used as source metamodel, the BN metamodel shown in Fig. 2.17 is used instead
as target metamodel.
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Figure 2.16: CPT for infrastructure nodes
Figure 2.17: Metamodel of BN
A high-level description of the most signiﬁcant parts of the transformation is pro-
vided in form of pseudocode. The following naming convention is adopted in the
description of the algorithms:
• NA: a BN A-node;
• NE: a BN E-node;
• NI : a BN I-node;
• NP : a BN P -node;
• NPRA: a BN PRA-node;
• NPRE: a BN PRE-node;
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• the names of the UML elements that are sources in a UML relationship are
subscripted with S;
• the names of the UML elements that are target in a UML relationship are
subscripted with T;
• The notation NX(Y ) stands for the BN X-node generated from the UML
Element Y;
In addition, the eﬀects of each algorithm is also described graphically to help the
reader understand the performed mapping.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode corresponding to the generation of the attack
nodes and arcs of the BN structure.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode corresponding to the generation of the attack
nodes and arcs of the BN structure. The transformation creates a BN A-node from
the Activities modeling the attacks. The transformation also takes into account the
Include UML relationships between Use Cases (if any) for creating dependencies
between couples of attacks.
The generation of the attack nodes and arcs of the BN structure, according to the
algorithm reported above, is exempliﬁed in Fig. 2.18. In this Figure two attacks
A1 and A2 are considered, and detailed through two Activities. In particular, A1
includes A2. The three actions of the two attacks generate three BN nodes, an
arc between nodes B and C is generated according to the existing UML Control
Flow between them. An additional arc, between nodes A (last action of A1 ) and
B (ﬁrst action of A2 ) is generated since the attack A2 includes the attack A1.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode corresponding to the generation of the infras-
tructure nodes (nodes I) and arcs of the BN structure. The transformation creates
the infrastructure nodes of the BN model from Classiﬁers representing physical el-
ements of the infrastructure. In this case, an important condition for obtaining
an infrastructure node is to set the asset tag of the stereotyped UML Elements;
in fact, only the Elements with a valued asset tag are considered by the transfor-
mation.
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Algorithm 1 generateAttackLevelBN
for all Activity Ac stereotyped as Attack do
for all ActivityNode An stereotyped as Action
in Ac do
create a BN node N_a;
end for
for all ControlFlow Cf in Ac do
if Cf is between two ActivityNodes A_S, A_T then
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_a(A_S );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_a(A_T );
end if
end for
end for
for all Include In between two UseCases UC_S, UC_T stereotyped as At-
tack do
if (UC_S is speciﬁed by the Activity A_S stereotyped as Attack) and
(UC_T is speciﬁed by the Activity A_T stereotyped as Attack) then
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_a(Al) where Al is the last action of A_S ;
outputnode(Ar) ← N_a(Af ) where Af is the ﬁrst action of A_T ;
end if
end for
Figure 2.18: Transformation for Attack
The generation of the infrastructure nodes and arcs of the BN structure, according
to the algorithm reported above, is exempliﬁed in Fig. 2.19. In this Figure three
sites A, B and C have been considered; an object Ob is located in A. C is not an
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Algorithm 2 generateInfrastructureLevelBN
for all Classiﬁer Cs stereotyped as Site do
if asset tag is deﬁned for Cs then
create a BN node N_i ;
for all Classiﬁer Ci stereotyped as Site in Cs do
if asset tag is deﬁned for Ci then
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_i(Ci);
outputnode(Ar) ← N_i(Cs);
end if
end for
end if
end for
for all Classiﬁer Co stereotyped as Object do
if asset tag is deﬁned for Co then
create a BN node N_i ;
if location tag is deﬁned for Co then
if location tagged value refers to a Site Si and
the asset tag is deﬁned for Si then
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_i(Co);
outputnode(Ar) ← N_i(Si);
end if
end if
end if
end for
asset (the asset tag is not deﬁned for it), hence only three BN nodes are generated,
corresponding to A, B and Ob. An arc is created from B to A since the former
is included into the latter (according to the UML Component Diagram). Another
arc connects Ob and A since the former is located into the latter. Note that, in
the last case, the arc corresponds to the value of the location tag since, extending
UML Classiﬁer, the stereotype Object can be applied also on Classes or on other
elements.
The following four algorithms generate the nodes and arcs of the protection level,
they are also in charge of generating the arcs of the BN model which represent
dependencies between the adjacent levels (i.e., from nodes belonging to the protec-
tion level to nodes belonging to the infrastructure level, and from nodes belonging
to the attack level to nodes belonging to the protection level).
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Figure 2.19: Transformation for Infrastructure
With respect to the BN structure depicted in Fig.2.9, Algorithm 3 generates:
• the protection nodes P and E corresponding to UML Element stereotyped
as Equipment and Operator;
• the arcs from the protection nodes P to the protection nodes E;
• the arcs from the attack nodes A to the protection nodes E;
• the arcs from the protection nodes E to the infrastructure nodes I.
Starting from UML Classes and Components stereotyped as Equipment (as well
a other derived stereotypes) or Operator, this algorithm generates a P -node, an
E-node and an arc between them.The arcs from A-nodes and E-nodes are drawn
according to the counteracts tag of the stereotyped UML Elements.
In addition, the protects tag, if deﬁned, creates an arc from the E-node to the I-
node of the protected infrastructure; the UML Dependency relationship between
two equipments, if any, generates an arc which from the independent E-node to
the dependent one. As an example, in Section 4.2 the detection of an intruder by
a thermal camera enables the tracking functionality by a pan-tilt-zoom camera.
The generation of the protection nodes and arcs of the BN structure according
to the algorithm reported above is exempliﬁed in Fig. 2.20. Speciﬁcally the three
equipments P1, P2 and P3 generate three homonyms nodes of type P, three others
of type E and three arcs which connect the node P to the node E. Since each i-th
equipment counteracts the i-th activity, then an arc for each couple of them is
generated. At last, since P3 protects the site I, another arc connecting the two
corresponding nodes is generated.
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Algorithm 3 generateProtectionLevelBN - P and E nodes
for all Class or Component C stereotyped as
Equipment or Operator do
create a BN node N_p;
create a BN node N_e;
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_p(C );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
if counteracts tag is deﬁned for C then
for all ActivityNode AN stereotyped as Action referred by the tagged
value counteracts do
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_a(AN );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
end for
end if
if protects tag is deﬁned for C then
for all Classiﬁer Cl stereotyped as Site or
Object referred by the tagged value protects do
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_i(Cl);
end for
end if
end for
for all Usage U between two Classes or Components U_S, U_T stereotyped
as Equipment do
CreateNodeFromProtocol(Ac);
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_e(U_T );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_e(U_S );
end for
Figure 2.20: Transformation for Protection
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With respect to the BN structure depicted in Fig.2.9, the following Algorithm 4
generates the nodes related to the protection protocols. This Algorithm is more
complex than the other, for this reason two procedures have been deﬁned and
properly invoked in the pseudocode. These two procedure will be described in
the following and will generate: (1) nodes and arcs corresponding to the internal
activities of a protocol and (2) arcs corresponding to the decision and merge nodes,
if used in the description of a protocol.
The remaining part of Algorithm 4 is used to manage the activation condition
of the protocol itself (speciﬁed through the triggeredBy tagged value) and the
connections with the protected sites. Note that the triggeredBy tag is typed as
VSL_Expression, the transformation algorithm works under the hypothesis that it
has been set as a simple logic condition (AND, OR and XOR) between equipments.
In detail, if the triggering equipments are in XOR relationship, then the nodes and
arcs corresponding to the protection protocol shall be replicated many times as the
number of triggering equipments in the logical condition. Otherwise, in cases of
AND and OR conditions, the nodes shall not be replicated, and the arcs connect
each node generated from a triggering equipment to the node representing the ﬁrst
action of the protocol.
The generation of the protection nodes and arcs of the BN structure accord-
ing to the algorithm reported above is exempliﬁed in Fig. 2.21. Speciﬁcally, in
Fig. 2.21(a), a protocol triggered by the XOR of two equipments Eq1 and Eq2 is
showed. The Algorithm just described, generates two diﬀerent chains of Bayesian
nodes, one for each equipment. In both chains the PRA-node related to the ﬁrst
equipment is connected to the E-node of one of the two triggering devices. The
PRE node of the ﬁnal activity is then connected to the I-node related to the site
I, protected by the protocol.
Fig. 2.21(b) reports the Bayesian network generated in case of AND and OR
boolean operators. In these cases the chain related to the protocol is not replicated,
both the E-node of the triggering equipments are connected to the PRA-node
related to the ﬁrst activity of the protocol. The ﬁnal PRE-node is connected to
the I-node related to the protected site, as in the previous case.
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Algorithm 4 generateProtectionLevelBN - PRA and PRE nodes
for all Activity Ac stereotyped as Protocol do
if triggeredBy tagged value for Ac contains XOR then
for all Class or Component C stereotyped as Protection contained in
the tagged value triggeredBy do
CreateNodeFromProtocol(Ac);
if DecisionNodes and MergeNodes exist in Ac then
CreateArcsForDecisionAndMergeNodes(Ac);
end if
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(Af ) where Af is the ﬁrst action of Ac;
end for
else
CreateNodeFromProtocol(Ac);
if DecisionNodes and MergeNodes exist in Ac then
CreateArcsForDecisionAndMergeNodes(Ac);
end if
for all Class or Component C stereotyped as Protection contained in
the tagged value triggeredBy do
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(Af ) where Af is the ﬁrst action of Ac;
end for
end if
if protects tag is deﬁned for Ac then
for all Classiﬁer C stereotyped as Infrastructure referred by the tagged
value protects do
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(Al) where Al is the last action of Ac;
outputnode(Ar) ← N_i(C );
end for
end if
end for
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(a) XOR
(b) AND-OR
Figure 2.21: triggeredBy pattern transformation for Protocol
The internal part of the Bayesian network related to the protocol is generated by
the Algorithm 5, which generates:
• the protection PRA and PRE nodes, corresponding to UML Elements
stereotyped as ProtocolRule;
• the arcs from PRA-nodes to PRE-nodes;
• the arcs from E-nodes to PRE-nodes;
• the arcs from PRE-nodes to the I-nodes.
The transformation generates a pair of PRA and PRE nodes for each UML Ac-
tivityNode stereotyped as ProtocolRule as well as an arc connecting them. The
PRA-node represents the starting of an action of a protection protocol, the PRE-
node represents the execution of that action. Since an action is executed by an
operator and could be supported by other protection systems (according to the
tagged values executedBy and supportedBy), additional arcs are generated from
related E-nodes to PRE-node of this action.
The generation of the protection nodes and arcs of the BN structure according to
the algorithm reported above is exempliﬁed in Fig. 2.22. The two actions PR1
Chapter 2. A Model-Driven Approach to Vulnerability Evaluation 64
Algorithm 5 CreateNodeFromProtocol procedure
CreateNodeFromProtocol(Activity Ac)
for all ActivityNode An stereotyped as ProtocolRule in Ac do
create a BN node N_pra;
create a BN node N_pre;
create a BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(An);
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(An);
for all Class or Component C stereotyped as Operator referred by the
tagged value executedBy do
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(An);
end for
if supportedBy tag is deﬁned for An then
for all Class or Component C stereotyped as Protection referred by the
tagged value supportedBy do
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(An);
end for
end if
if protects tag is deﬁned for An then
for all Classiﬁer C stereotyped as Infrastructure referred by the tagged
value protects do
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(An);
outputnode(Ar) ← N_i(C );
end for
end if
end for
for all ControFlow Cf in Ac do
if Cf is between two ActivityNodes A_S, A_T stereotyped as ProtocolRule
then
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(A_S );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(A_T );
end if
end for
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and PR2, stereotyped as ProtocolRule generates four Bayesian nodes (two for
each one of them). Since both PR1 and PR2 are executed by P1, two arcs from
the E-node related to P1 to the PRE-node of PR1 and to the PRE-node of PR2
are generated. An arc from the PRE-node of PR1 to the I1 node is generated
since the action PR1 protects I1, as well as the arc from the E-node of P2 to the
PRE-node related to PR2 since this action is supported by P2.
Figure 2.22: Transformation for Protocol
Decision and merge nodes require the generation of complex structures, in terms
of arcs; for this reason these structures are generated by the Algorithm 6. In
detail, the Algorithm connects the predecessor node with the successors nodes
and these last together, avoiding the contemporary activation of more than one
branch. Obviously the conditions indicated on the exiting branches shall be in
mutual exclusions; one ELSE condition is also admitted.
The generation of the protection nodes and arcs of the BN structure according to
the algorithm reported above is exempliﬁed in Fig. 2.23. In this case a protocol
control ﬂow, exiting from the action A, can either enters the B or the C action on
the basis of the identiﬁcation of an attack action by the equipment Eq. From this
situation, a Bayesian network connecting the PRE-node related to A is connected
to both PRA-nodes related to the actions B and C ; another arc, connecting the
E-node related to Eq to the PRA-node related to B, is also generated. At last
the arc from the PRA-node related to B to the PRA-node related to C is added,
in order to model the mutual exclusion between the two branches.
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Algorithm 6 CreateArcsForDecisionAndMergeNodes procedure
CreateArcsForDecisionAndMergeNodes(Activity Ac)
for all DecisionNode D in Ac do
for all ControlFlow Cf where Cf_S is D do
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(CfE_S ) where CfE is the ControlFlow in which
D is CfE_T ;
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(Cf_T );
if condition(Cf ) contains ELSE then
for all ControlFlow CfO diﬀerent from Cf where CfO_S is D do
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(CfO_T );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(Cf_T );
end for
else
for all Class or Component C contained in condition(Cf ) do
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_e(C );
outputnode(Ar) ← N_pra(Cf_T );
end for
end if
end for
end for
for all MergeNode M where M_T is not a FinalNode do
for all ControlFlow Cf where Cf_T is M do
create BN arc Ar ;
inputnode(Ar) ← N_pre(Cf_S );
outputnode(Ar)← N_pra(CfE_T ) where CfE is the ControlFlow in which
M is CfE_S ;
end for
end for
Figure 2.23: Transformation for Decision Node
Chapter 3
An Innovative Interoperability
Framework for PSIM Systems
As stated in section 1.3, the integration of security systems is one of the primary
requirements in the scenario of the physical security. Actually, the companies'
application portfolio is still a mosaic founded on several independent systems. In
contrast with this, new applications can't operate as stand-alone entity and they
need to integrate with existing systems. In addition, a real security improvement
can be reached only through the cooperation not only among ICT (Information &
Communication Technology) systems but also among operators belonging to the
same interest domain, resulting in the adoption of a new class of systems: the
Systems of Systems.
The Department of Defense (DoD) deﬁnes a SoS as a set or arrangement of sys-
tems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger
system that delivers unique capabilities [85]. The architecture requirements of an
integrated security system comply with the ﬁve main characteristics of SoS individ-
uated by Mayer [86]: (i) Geographic Distribution (the several systems of an SoS are
geographically distributed), (ii) Operational Independence (the SoS is composed
of systems which are independent which can often perform their functionalities
when not working with other constituent systems), (iii) Managerial Independence
(each system of SoS can keep its own managerial sphere that is each of them is sep-
arately acquired and integrated and maintains a continuing operational existence
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independent of the SoS), (iv) Evolutionary Development (functions and purposes
of SoS can dynamically change and systems can be added, removed, and modiﬁed
with experience), and (v) Emergent Behaviour (SoS are capable to provide new
functionalities resulting from cooperation of the constituent systems).
This chapter reports the experience with the concrete application of a SoS ar-
chitecture to rail mass-transit systems. Speciﬁcally, it describes part of the work
conducted within the Secur-ED project by Ansaldo STS in the realization of a
framework which allows for the interoperability between diﬀerent security equip-
ments.
3.1 Context: the Secur-ED Project
The complexity of modern security systems, deputed to the protection of mass-
transit transportation, reﬂects the complexity of the transportation systems them-
selves: a very high number of daily passengers, an high number of access points,
an high number of interconnection nodes and neuralgic transport interchanges to
economic activities require complex interconnections of existing and newest protec-
tion devices, security processes and organizations leading to a System of Systems
(SoS), based on networked communication.
Secur-ED was a demonstration EU-funded project aiming at integrating technolo-
gies and processes covering all aspects of urban transport security for typical big
and mid-sized European cities. Completed in September 2014, the project involved
41 partners (industries, operators, universities and research institutions) with the
intent to provide a comprehensive set of organizational, procedural and technical
tools addressing the major sources of threats and disruption and validate the pro-
vided solutions through the demonstrations in several real contexts[87]. One of
main objectives of Secur-ED was to implement an interoperability framework in
order to tie all security actors into a SoS. The focus was on enabling providers to
adapt their solutions with minimal non-recurring costs and proving the maturity
of modern technologies by putting them in operation. Integration was demon-
strated in four ﬂagship demonstrations which took place in Paris, Milan, Madrid
and Berlin as well as in other satellite (smaller-scale) demos. Ansaldo STS played
diﬀerent roles in the project, in particular it was responsible for developing the
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interoperable framework and collecting and analyzing results in order to provide
guidelines and best practices. The project results are publicly available in[42],[88],
[89], [43], and [90].
3.1.1 Design Principles
This Section aims to describe the fundamental technical, technological and func-
tional requirements adopted for the architecture design in the Secur-ED project.
3.1.1.1 Security Technologies and Integration
The security technological panorama has been certainly strengthened in the last
decade thanks to the introduction of numerous new technologies to detect and
deter more disparate attacks. Nevertheless, many security technologies, which
have been developed and deployed in the past, have gone through upgrades in
order to adapt themselves to the evolved security measures. Furthermore, in the
railway industry, the life cycle of these security technologies extends much longer
in comparison to other industries; as a consequence a requirement of the overall
architecture is to sustain the existing legacy technologies. So, one of the primary
concerns was to integrate legacy and innovative technologies in a single manage-
ment system.
3.1.1.2 Interoperability
Nowadays, interoperability is a fundamental concern for improving security in the
transportation domain. In fact, this is an essential quality for a distributed sys-
tems as well as for a SoS. This application domain is characterized by the presence
of diﬀerent public and private companies, and its security involves various kinds
of organizations. Then, for counteracting serious threats like terrorist attacks, im-
portant requirements are information sharing and collaboration at the occurrence
of security accidents. This is possible only through an high interoperability, which
can enable the interaction among security systems, diﬀerent transport operators
authorities (e.g. metro, railway, bus) and so on.
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3.1.1.3 Open Standard
By now, the beneﬁts arising from the usage of open standards are fully blown. To-
day, also in the context of railway security, the need to adopt open standards is very
strong. Multiple factors drove this trend, such as the growing interest towards the
security issues, the market orientation in innovative security technologies, changed
current regulations in critical infrastructure protection matters, and so on. Other
reasons can be found in the fact that they help to overcome the barriers towards
the subsystems integration, reducing the dependencies from speciﬁc vendors and
simplifying the communication among stakeholders. Furthermore, a recent trend
is to go towards a convergence of safety and security and thus, the adoption of
open standards supports this change.
3.1.1.4 Event Orientation
The security operates in an unpredictable and dynamic context where an attack
can happen anytime. So, the event-driven approach [91] deals with needs of pro-
tection systems perfectly. This approach is built around the idea that events are
the most signiﬁcant elements in the system and that they are produced somewhere
in the system and consumed somewhere else in the system. Thus, two concepts
are basic in this approach: event and notiﬁcation. An event can be deﬁned as
something that happens somewhere that is of interest for one or more objects;
while, the notiﬁcation is the message sent by an object to the interested parts to
inform about the event. In this perspective, when the various security systems
(e.g., video analysis, intrusion detection, sound detection, management systems,
etc.) detect particular events or situations, they generate a notiﬁcation and send
it to management systems.
3.1.1.5 Scalability, Modularity & Reusability
These requirements are tied directly to one of the most strategic objectives: the
deﬁnition of an architecture which is applicable in diﬀerent contexts, like big and
mid-sized European cities, and is adoptable to new threat scenarios. Hence, a
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modular architecture is necessary in order to be extended or reduced depending
on speciﬁc security needs. Given the large numbers of diﬀerent technologies of
a complex security system, modularity is a critical aspect of the design and de-
velopment phase since it allows for decomposing the system into a number of
components that may be mixed and matched in a multiple conﬁgurations.
3.2 Interoperability Framework
Interoperability is an essential quality for a distributed systems as well as for a
SoS and it has been much discussed by the scientiﬁc community. According to
ISO/IEC 2382-01, Information Technology Vocabulary, Fundamental Terms [92],
it is deﬁned as: "the capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data
among various functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or
no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those units".
Interoperability is the key concept to arrive at systems-of-systems that support
security awareness and response in public urban transport. Starting from what
stated in[93] which presents a stack with diﬀerent layers of interoperability, the aim
was to make the eﬀort for reaching as more levels as possible. In particular, tech-
nical interoperability is achieved by means of common standard communication
protocols in order to exchange data between the component systems, syntactic in-
teroperability is achieved adopting a common data model and eventually, semantic
interoperability is achieved by deﬁning the content of the information exchanged
in the chosen data model. In addition, in order to achieve a higher level of in-
teroperability conﬁgurable operative procedures have been used for an eﬃcient
management of security incidents[89].
The ﬁgure 3.1 shows the general paradigm from an architectural point of view.
The overall architecture, shall rely on a dependable and eﬀective communication
frameworks which allows events sharing through standard interfaces. In this way,
it enables interoperability of security systems (depicted at the bottom) but also of
management systems through integration and aggregation of information into one
or more control center (depicted in the upper part). The role of a control center
is to gather and correlate various event sources into a single platform in order to
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show to operator a coherent situation with what is happening. Furthermore, this
paradigm allows also to integrate easily other kinds of systems like events correla-
tion systems which are able to reason about heterogeneous data, implementing the
concept of fusion through event correlation. Such systems can play an important
role for an eﬀective enhancing of the situation awareness and for improving the
decision making process of human operators [94].
Figure 3.1: General paradigm of a security architecture
Examples of event-based communication frameworks can be found in [95], where
the authors describes a service based approach which integrate diﬀerent com-
ponents in automotive domain. In [96] an innovative event-driven architecture,
integrated with web services, is described. [97] proposes a reference architecture
for event-driven traﬃc management systems, which enables the analysis and pro-
cessing of complex event for decision support in sensor-based traﬃc management
systems.
One of the most essential enabling element of interoperability is the data model for
events exchanging. Typical attributes for the event speciﬁcations are: an unique
identiﬁer, the type of event, the time when the event occurred, the location where
the event happened, the device or system that originated the event, etc. At this
aim, the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) [98] standard of the Oasis Consortium
has been chosen. Based on best practices identiﬁed in academic research and real-
world experience, CAP is a simple but general format for exchanging all-hazard
emergency alerts and public warnings over all kinds of networks. It provides a
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XML-based template for eﬀective warning messages, so allowing dissemination of
consistent alerts simultaneously over many diﬀerent warning systems, thus increas-
ing warning eﬀectiveness while simplifying the warning task. Also, it facilitates the
detection of emerging patterns in local warnings of various kinds, such as might
indicate an undetected hazard or hostile act.
3.2.1 Implementation Principles
The interoperability framework is the key component of the general paradigm
presented above (see ﬁgure 3.1). It is based on architectural patterns and open
standards which are successfully used in other industries; in fact, it combines
the intelligence and proactiveness of Event-Driven Architecture (EDA) with the
organizational capabilities found in Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) [99].
Basically, it is an event broker Web Service-based which allows for interchanging
of events. It contains also a discovery service which is able to discover new services
inside the overall system.
The interaction pattern used to disseminate information among diﬀerent entities
is event-driven, also called notiﬁcation-based (a review of dissemination protocols
can be found in [100]), based on the well-known publish-subscribe scheme. In
addition, with the aim of uniquely identifying the resources (e.g. sensors, systems,
etc.), the Uniform Resource Identiﬁer (URI) standard, and speciﬁcally the Uniform
Resource Name (URN) syntax [101], has been adopted.
The event broker has been developed in Java language adopting the following stan-
dards: WS-BaseNotiﬁcation [102] for the service implementation, and the CAP [98]
format as events data model. In order to meet diﬀerent needs (e.g., integration of
a CAP alert into a notiﬁcation message or support to development) some exten-
sions have been made to the WS-BaseNotiﬁcation standard. Nevertheless, these
extensions don't change the behavior of standard functionalities but just help to
cover these speciﬁc needs.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the event broker interface is composed of two interfaces,
one for exchanging the events and another for managing the subscriptions. In
this way, the security systems are the producers while the integrated management
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Figure 3.2: Class diagram of event broker
systems are consumers. Actually, this is not a strict assignment since a generic
system can play both the role of producer and consumer. For example, this is the
case of an event correlation system: this kind of system initially plays the role
of consumer, as it receives the events, but it use the received events to generate
new events and send them to the broker. This peculiarity highlights the ﬂexibility
which has been introduced into the architecture.
WS-BaseNotiﬁcation is a generic event interface that can transport generic XML
contents so, in order to wrap an alert into the notiﬁcation message, two following
actions have been performed:
1. the import of the XML schema of the CAP in the wsdl;
2. the extension of the NotiﬁcationMessageHolderType, a type deﬁned in the
wsdl (Figure 3.3).
The notify service scenario is shown in Figure 3.4: the producer invokes the notify
service exposed by the event broker for sending a notiﬁcation message, and then
the consumer receives messages directly from the broker through the notify service
that, in turn, it exposes.
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Figure 3.3: Extension for alert CAP
Figure 3.4: Interaction for notiﬁcation message
3.3 Experimentation on Field: Enabling the System-
of-Systems
The interoperability framework has been successfully tested in the scope of Secur-
ED project on diﬀerent on mass transit systems of several European cities. In
this work the experimentation is referred to Milan demo, carried out on ATM1
transportation.
Architectures for mass-transit security consist of several distributed and hetero-
geneous components, enabling the detection of attack actions, and of integrated
management systems, able to collect and correlate to a some extent the detected
events into a shared situation picture. The security needs of the Secur-ED project
asked for an open architecture that shall be adaptable to diﬀerent environments
and that shall address wide spectrum of threats, ranging from low-probability
high-impact events (e.g., terrorist attacks) to daily threats (e.g., acts of vandal-
ism).
According to the general paradigm outlined in previous section, the requirements
1Azienda Trasporti Milanesi-public transportation company in the Milan metropolitan area
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listed in the paragraph 3.1.1, and also in continuity with the previous project
PROTECTRAIL[87], the realized architecture for the Secur-ED demos was an
Event Driven Service Oriented Architecture (SOA 2.0) whose building blocks are
shown in Figure 3.5. The combination of web services and event-driven systems
was able to address the interoperability issue in heterogeneous distributed systems,
enabling asynchronous interactions.
Figure 3.5: The Secur-ED Architecture
The experimentation concerned the technical feasibility of the solution and the
implementation of actual attack scenarios in order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
the proposed architecture in mass-transit domain. The main aim was to demon-
strate how innovative and legacy security technologies could be used and inte-
grated, in order to improve the protection of critical assets. At the same time, the
experimentation goals were to validate technologies and procedures used in the
demonstrators and show the versatility, interoperability, and interchangeability of
the security systems as well as their integration within existing operational proce-
dures and are appropriate with respect to societal demands.
The interoperability framework has been used for creating the Secur-ED SOCC
(Security Operator Control Center), which is a global security control center able
to coordinate organizations with authorities, exchange information and integrate
systems, also belonging to diﬀerent public transport operators. Its eﬀectiveness
has been proved by the results of three real scenarios aiming at demonstrating the
implementation of a local SoS in the Milan Area. In particular, the image 3.6 rep-
resents a general map of the hardware architecture for the Milan demonstration,
where the following scenarios took place:
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• Scenario 1 concerned the identiﬁcation and tracking of persons presenting
a suspicious behavior within the network of public transport managed and
owned by diﬀerent PTOs;
• Scenario 2 was related to the protection of a train in a stabling area and
depot yard;
• Scenario 3 dealt with the reaction to an event in case of emergency and the
subsequent management of the crisis;
Name and location are reported for each element in the map. At the top level, the
technical room situated in ATM's premises of Monte Rosa is depicted in which all
the necessary servers to connect all the protection systems with the SECUR-ED
Control Centre provided by Ansaldo, composed by the Security Management Sys-
tem (SMS) and the interoperability framework. The result is a true PSIM system
able to monitor and manage events detected by new and legacy system (i.e. the
ATM's Control Centre (KABA)) providing a decisions support. In particular, SMS
manages and controls a hierarchy of subsystem and devices from a central posi-
tion. So it improves the situations awareness allowing a prompt reaction. In fact,
a security operator has a global vision of what happens and he is able to supervise
an emergency situation supporting the local operator with valuable information
and coordinating the operations. On the contrary, the bottom level describes all
the integrated security systems, composed by devices and if anything local servers.
In detail, the systems are: CBRNE sensors for detecting radiological and chemical
materials, several video analysis systems for tracking and crowding people, and
for checking empty train, RFID systems and ticketing systems for tracking people
by means of tickets equipped with RFID tags.
On the whole, the three scenarios have involved two operators of public transport
(ATM and FNM), diﬀerent Milan areas (Malpensa airport, 3 metro stations and
depot area) and several organizations (police, municipal authority, ﬁre brigades,
ect) covering diﬀerent security needs. In the tracking scenario, a suspicious person
is followed through two diﬀerent metro lines (ATM and FNM2) without losing him.
In the depot scenario, the integration of diﬀerent innovative technological systems
(CCTVs, perimeter protection, train scanning and monitoring, procedures) has
2FNM Group Milano S.p.A.-Lombardy Regions Railway Operator
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Figure 3.6: Hardware architecture in Milan Demonstration
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provided a full security of the vehicles in the depot area. Thanks to the interop-
erability framework all systems worked together, succeeding even if some actions
of an attack are partially performed. In the crisis management scenario diﬀer-
ent actors (Operator staﬀ, Ambulance, Fire brigades, etc.) worked together to
face a danger situation and to rescue people in the shortest time. Combining the
three scenarios it is possible to deduce how the whole system was able to manage
eﬀectively diﬀerent phases of a critical situation: before, during and after. For
better clarify this point, please refer to the table 3.1 where some relevant system
capabilities are listed.
Scenario Before During After
1 Identiﬁcation
of suspicious
passenger
Tracking of
suspicious pas-
senger in a
multimodal
transit network
2 Perimeter pro-
tection
Tracking of in-
truder in area
depot
3 Crowding detec-
tion
Crisis Man-
agement for
evacuation
procedures
Table 3.1: System capabilities related to phases of the scenarios
3.3.1 A Real Usage Scenario
This section describes the tracking scenario in regard to the alarms exchanged
through the interoperability framework. In this scenario diﬀerent security systems
have been integrated for tracking a terrorist having a dangerous chemical agent,
who goes from Milan center to the Malpensa airport by three metro lines (two
operated by ATM and one by FNM):
• the TVCC-based system for tracking people (producer);
• the ticket-based system for tracking people (producer);
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• the RFID-based system for tracking people (producer);
• the CBRNe sensor for detecting chemical material (producer);
• the Security Management System (consumer).
The event broker sends all events generated by producers towards the security
management system. In this way, the security operator has a global knowledge
of what is happening, improving the situation awareness. The ﬁgure 3.7 shows a
sequence diagram with the main events sent by the producers above.
A man with a briefcase enters in a Milan metro station. His behavior is perceived
as suspicious, then the tracking procedure starts. The person is individuated and
the ﬁrst event suspect tagged is sent through the event broker. In Figure 3.8 the
content of this event is shown, where some value tags are speciﬁed. The body of
this message is a CAP alert where the tags contain information about the security
system (the value, expressed in the URN syntax, represents the tracking people
TVCC-based), the speciﬁc camera (source tag), the timestamp and the event type.
From now on, all the cameras which detect the man are able to send an event of
suspect detected allowing the tracking through the video ﬂows. The man buys
a ticket equipped with RFID, whose serial number is marked. In this way, when
the suspect goes toward the turnstiles for validating the ticket (both in entrance
and exit) the ticketing system sends an event which allows to follow him when it
crosses diﬀerent stations. Similarly, the RFID system sends an event when detects
the ticket in the stations. Thanks to the use of the event broker, combining these
three kind of information the probability of losing the man decreases considerably.
Furthermore, at Malpensa airport a CBRNe sensor is deployed in the entrance,
so the chemical substance in the man's briefcase is detected and thus the security
operator alerts the competent authorities promptly.
Chapter 3. An Innovative Interoperability Framework for PSIM Systems 81
Figure 3.7: Events in the tracking scenario
Figure 3.8: Suspicious detected event

Chapter 4
Application to the Mass-Transit
Domain
This Chapter describes the application of the proposed approaches to a real world
case study: the ATM's depot located in Gorgonzola, Milan. Two realistic attack
scenarios have been considered: these scenarios have been taken from those deﬁned
by the SECUR-ED Project. In detail, the selected scenarios have been considered
as signiﬁcant and realistic inside the context of an European project since their
realism have been studied through a risk assessment so that they correspond to
real concern on security threats. They regarded the execution of physical attacks
and were devoted to the demonstration of the eﬀectiveness of integrated protection
systems; in fact, these scenarios ended with the blocking of the attacker.
The case study will be presented in relation to the two perspectives given in this
thesis: the architectural approach deﬁned in the Secur-ED project and the analysis
approach deﬁned in the METRIP project.
4.1 Case Study
As said, the case study consists of two scenarios, both of them concerning the
train protection within a stabling area or a depot yard. In particular, the aim is
to preserve the integrity of trains both when they enter or leave the depot area and
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they come to rest at depot area. It takes place in ATMs Gorgonzola depot since
it is potentially exposed to many attacks by graﬃti perpetrators and intruders
because of its location, very far from the city. The attacks concern an intrusion
in depot in order to make graﬃti on a train and a radiological attack. The aim of
the scenario is double:
1. assuring the capacity to identify any access violation at the depot (by perime-
ter or by any other entry);
2. demonstrating the capability to detect presence of unauthorized people or
dangerous objects, vandalistic acts or sabotages against the trains.
4.2 Architectural Approach
The depot area is showed in Fig. 4.2(a): it is connected to the railway line through
a main entrance with two tracks. The total area is around 450 meters long and
100 meters wide, while the internal of the depot is around 250 meters long and 75
meters wide. The protection system comprises diﬀerent security devices deployed
in the depot area. The perimeter of the area is covered by six thermal cameras
whose video streams are analyzed by a VCA server which performs motion detec-
tion algorithms. In addition, in order to cover the overall depot area PTZ cameras
are used exploiting their variability of ﬁeld view. This is made by an innovative
system based on VCA using detections of thermal cameras for activating object
tracking algorithms that automatically pilots a PTZ camera. At this aim, thermal
cameras are organized in clusters with PTZ cameras. Each cluster is composed
by two thermal cameras, which are able to detect a human intrusion, and a PTZ
camera, which traces the intruder's movements. Thus, the PTZ camera is auto-
matically activated by the detection of the thermal cameras. Moreover, a CBRNe
system is deployed close to the rail exit. It is used to verify the presence of radio-
logical elements on a vehicle which is entering the service. Furthermore, another
system VCA-based is used for onboard protection. Using the onbord cameras, an
On Board Empty Vehicle Detection (OEVD) system is used to detect the presence
of unauthorized people when a vehicle enters the depot. Finally, a Security Guard
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(SG) and a Security Operator (SO) are present. The ﬁrst is at depot area while
the second at the control center. The ﬁgure 4.1 depicts the hardware architecture
for this scenario.
The two considered attack scenarios regards an intrusion and a chemical attack. In
the following, showing the pictures taken on the ﬁeld during the demo, we describe
the evolution of the two scenarios.
• Scenario 1: intrusion inside depot. In Fig. 4.2(a), a top-view of the
area depot and of the deployed protection devices is depicted; the yellow line
traces the path followed by the intruder, while the pink one the path followed
by the SG. In detail, the intruder enters within the depot area (Fig. 4.2(b)),
climbing over the fence at the point indicated by the red star. The thermal
camera, placed close to this entry point, detects the intrusion, sends alarms
to the Security Control Center, and enables the tracking functionality of the
PTZ cameras. The SG, alerted by the SO, goes to the place where the in-
trusion has been detected. In the meantime the intruder crosses the line of
tracks and heads toward the covered area of the depot (Fig. 4.2(c)), where
the trains are sheltered, and follows the dirt road near the depot perimeter,
on the opposite side from which he entered. Still activated by a thermal
camera, a PTZ camera follows the intruder until he passes behind a building
where it looses him. Another thermal camera detects him again along the
perimeter and the associated PTZ camera follows him; so the SO alerts the
SG, who changes direction and moves towards him. Thanks to the tracking
algorithm running on the PTZ cameras, the SO is able to support in a more
accurate way the SG, who reaches the intruder and stops him(Fig. 4.2(d)).
• Scenario 2: radiological attack on the train. A train ends the service
and enters into the depot area (Fig. 4.3(a)); the OEVD system checks the
presence of unauthorized people on the vehicle (Fig. 4.3(b)). The presence
of the intruder is hence individuated and, before the SG reaches the place,
the intruder gets oﬀ the train (Fig. 4.3(c)) and put a radiological weapon
on the external body of the vehicle (Fig. 4.3(d)). Then he runs away, but
the SG is able to stop him (Fig. 4.3(e)) thanks to detections performed by
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Figure 4.1: Hardware architecture for depot scenario
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diﬀerent sensors deployed in the depot. Before the vehicle enters in service
(Fig. 4.3(f)), the CBRNe sensor, placed close to the exit of the depot area,
detects the radiological agent emitted by the weapon (Fig. 4.3(g)); so the
train moves toward a dead track and the necessary emergency procedures
are executed (Fig. 4.3(h)).
(a) Intruder path and protection devices in area de-
pot
(b) Intruder is in the area depot
(c) Intruder crosses the line of track (d) Security stops the intruder
Figure 4.2: Intrusion and tracking scenario
4.3 Analysis Approach
The objective of this section is to show how the vulnerability, evaluated as the
probability of having a successful attack, varies according to the physical features
of the adopted protection system. The nature and the positions of the devices have
not been changed with respect to the realistic scenarios since, in the real applica-
tion inside SECUR-ED, they have been eﬀective against the considered attacks.
A quantitative analysis of the vulnerability have been conducted by applying the
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(a) The train enters in depot area and OEVD
starts
(b) OEVD checks train
(c) Intruder gets oﬀ (d) Intruder sabotages the train
(e) Security stops the intruder (f) The train leaves the depot
(g) CBRNe sensor during the train transit (h) CBRNe unit performs the emergency pro-
cedures
Figure 4.3: CBRNe and on-board monitoring scenario
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METRIP approach, performing lastly a sensitivity analysis on the automatically
generated Bayesian Network. In detail, we modelled the system by applying the
CIP_VAM UML Proﬁle, representing the interest portions of the system, the
critical assets, the attacks and the protection system. Then, taking advantage of
the automatic transformation described in paragraph 2.5.3, we evaluate the vul-
nerability corresponding to the given conﬁguration of protection systems. The
generated Bayesian Network has been analysed with the JavaBayes tool1, while
the sensitivity analysis have been conducted by implementing a trivial Java ap-
plication which automates the execution of the network with the addressed tool.
Table 4.1 summarizes the model parameters.
4.3.1 Infrastructure Model
The entire system is modelled through Composite Structure Diagrams. For sake
of simplicity here we describe only the portion of the model that we consider
necessary to understand better the following analysis: in fact, the set of tagged
values modelling the geometrical features of each infrastructural element are here
not shown. The Composite Structure Diagram in Fig. 4.4(a) provides a view of the
whole area involved in both the scenarios, highlighting on one hand the sub-areas
(stereotyped as Site) and objects (stereotyped as Object) of interest, and, on the
other, the nested structure of the various elements.
At highest level of detail, the infrastructure has been modelled as a unique area
(DepotArea) to whom is applied the video surveillance system. Then, the area
under analysis is decomposed into subareas, the internal of the depot (Depot)
and three external subareas (Area1, Area2 and Area3). Speciﬁcally, the three
external sub-areas have been deﬁned according to the application range of the
cluster of cameras belonging to the protection system. Inside each area, a speciﬁc
set of tracks is present; hence we deﬁned diﬀerent classes, one for each site (e.g.,
Track1 inside Area1) and we stereotyped those as Object. The tagged value
multiplicity, not shown in the ﬁgure, has been used to model how many tracks
are present inside each area. Furthermore, inside the depot, ServiceTrains have
been modelled through a class stereotyped as Object.
1http://www.cs.cmu.edu/javabayes/
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Table 4.1: Model parameters
Parameter Value
Number of attackers 1
Number of Security Guard 1
Availability of Security Guard 0.03
Eﬀectiveness of Security Guard with PTZ support 0.7
Number of Security Operator 1
Availability of Security Operator 0.03
Number of thermal cameras 6
Failure rate of thermal camera 0.0012
Fnr of thermal camera 0.001
Fpr of thermal camera 0.05
Number of PTZ cameras 3
Failure rate of PTZ camera 0.0012
Fnr of PTZ camera 0.05
Fpr of PTZ camera 0.1
Number of OEVD System 1
Failure rate of OEVD System 0.0012
Fnr of OEVD System 0.01
Fpr of OEVD System 0.001
Number of CBRNe 1
Failure rate of CBRNe 0.012
Fnr of CBRNe 0.02
Fpr of CBRNe 0.1
Number of On-Board Camera 1
Failure rate of On-Board Camera 0.0012
Fnr of On-Board Camera 0.01
Fpr of On-Board Camera 0.1
Failure rate of Fence 0.000001
Other two classes model the other interest sites of the attack scenarios: Rail-
wayLine represents the external railway which enters the depot; Bridge models
the bridge outside the depot. At last, Train represents an external train that is
running along the line and eventually will enter the depot.
The entrances of the depot are stereotyped as Interface: the Class Diagram de-
picted in the Fig. 4.4(b) reports the two accesses, from the line (used by the trains)
and from the bridge (used by the attackers).
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(a) Composite Diagram
(b) Class Diagram with interfaces
Figure 4.4: Infrastructure model
4.3.2 Attack Model
The two attack scenarios have been modelled through Use Case Diagrams and
detailed through Activity Diagrams.
As described in Section ??, in the ﬁrst scenario a writer intrudes in the depot area
in order to ﬁnd a train on which to draw graﬃti. Fig. 4.5 shows the corresponding
attack model, where the Use Case Diagram (Fig. 4.5(a)) is composed by the actor
Writer, stereotyped as Attacker, and by two use cases, stereotyped as Attack. In
particular, there is an inclusion relation between the use cases since the intrusion
is necessary to perform the graﬃti attack. The Activity Diagram in Fig. 4.5(b)
details the use case, previously described, showing the sequence of steps performed
by the intruder. Each step has been stereotyped as Action.
In the second attack scenario a terrorist performs a radiological attack on a train
by placing a radiological element on the external part of the carriage. Before this
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(a) Use case attack (b) Activity Diagram of intrusion
attack
Figure 4.5: Scenario 1: Attack model
attack, the terrorist shall intrude the depot by remaining on the train at the end of
the trip. Hence, the Use Case Diagram related to this attack (Fig. 4.6(a)) reports
two use cases in which the one representing the radiological attack that includes the
use case representing the intrusion. With respect to the Writer, the Terrorist is
highly determined, patient and adaptive, hence the tagged values skill and ﬁrmness
highlight this diﬀerence. Fig. 4.6(b) and Fig. 4.6(c) depict the Activity Diagrams
which detail respectively the intrusion and the radiological attack use cases (this
decomposition allows to consider separately the speciﬁc actions related to the two
modeling phases of the attack). Hence, it is possible to reuse the intrusion use
case in other possible attacks (performed by the terrorist) exploiting the inclusion
dependency between use cases.
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(a) Use case attack
(b) Activity Diagram of intrusion
attack
(c) Activity Diagram of radiological attack
Figure 4.6: Scenario 2: Attack model
4.3.3 Protection Model
This Section describes the protection model. It consists of a set of protection
systems (Fig. 4.7), referred by protocols (Fig. 4.8) and attack models.
Human resources (stereotyped as Operator) are employed to defend the asset in
both scenarios: SecurityOperator and SecurityGuard. The ﬁrst one is in
charge of supervise and manage protections, while the second one deals with the
physical defence of the area; for this reason, in the model they have diﬀerent skills,
costs, protection objectives and so on (see tagged values in Fig. 4.7(a)).
As described before, the depot perimeter is protected, by a Fence (stereotyped
as Barrier) and by six thermal cameras (D1,D3-D72) equipped with motion de-
tection algorithms. As shown in Fig. 4.7(b), the thermal cameras are modelled
2for sake of simplicity, Fig. 4.7(b) details only the camera D1.
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(a) Protection human-based (b) Equipment for intrusion and tracking
(c) Equipment for on-board monitoring and radiological
attack
Figure 4.7: Protection systems of Protection model
using the Camera stereotype and, for each of them, tagged values specify their
own features such as resolution, processing, nature, counteracts (it gives infor-
mation about the actions of the attack to whom the protection device reacts).
Moreover, there are three PTZ cameras (I1-I33) stereotyped as PTZ, a speciﬁc
form of Camera; consequently, in addition to tagged values already mentioned
for thermal ones, some own features such as pan, tilt e zoom are reported by
means of additional tagged values. The PTZ cameras are logically organized in
clusters with the thermal cameras in order to improve the security of depot and
support the intervention operations: brieﬂy, when the motion detection algorithm
of a thermal camera detects an intrusion, the PTZ camera belonging to its own
cluster is activated and the object tracking starts. Since the PTZ camera requires
3for sake of simplicity, Fig. 4.7(b) details only the camera I1.
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(a) Intrusion in area depot
(b) Presence on board (c) Presence of radioactive material
Figure 4.8: Protocols of Protection model
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a thermal camera to be activeted, each cluster is modelled by means of the UML
dependency << usage >>, as depicted in Fig. 4.9.
(a) Cluster 1 (b) Cluster 2
(c) Cluster 3
Figure 4.9: Clusters of thermal and PTZ cameras
The behaviours of the operators depend on the detection and tracking performed
by the clusters and they obey to precise procedures that are represented by means
of three protocols, one of which is showed in Fig. 4.8(a)4. Since we have just one
intruder, the activation of the protocol is triggered by the XOR of two thermal
cameras (triggeredBy=[D1 XOR D6]). Basically, the SecurityOperator veriﬁes
the intruder alarm generated by the thermal camera and then supports the Secu-
rityGuard to catch the intruder. If the tracking algorithm correctly starts and
pilots the PTZ, the Security Operator can watch the video streams and point
the exact position of the intruder out to the Security Guard. In particular,
the possibility to support the SecurityGuard with or without the object track-
ing running on PTZ camera is modelled by the decision node, in which the exit
branch is chosen according to the availability of the PTZ camera.
4for sake of simplicity, Fig. 4.8(a) reports only one of the protocols, since they are substantially
similar.
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As for the onboard intrusion, the OEVDSystem performs on board monitoring
when the train is out of service and enters the depot. This innovative device has
been stereotyped as sensor as showed in Fig. 4.7(c). When the OEVDSystem
detects a presence on board (counteracts=[RemainsOnTheTrain]) the related pro-
tocol (Fig. 4.8(b)) is activated. It involves two steps: after the OEVDSystem
detection the SecurityOperator veriﬁes the alarm using an on board camera
(supportedBy=[OnBoardCamera]) and calls the SecurityGuard to apprise him
about the intrusion so that he can catch him when the train comes in depot.
Finally, the CBRNe sensor (stereotyped with sensor) checks all the trains which
leave the depot for resuming transportation service, in order to detect the pres-
ence of possible radioactive material (counteracts= [ContaminedTrainEntersInSer-
vice]). In case of detection of radiological material, the simple protocol shown in
ﬁgure 4.8(c) is performed.
4.3.4 Vulnerability Analysis
4.3.4.1 Scenario 1
This section describes the results obtained by analyzing the Bayesian Network,
generated by applying to the ﬁrst scenario (intrusion in area depot) the trans-
formation. The resulting Bayesian Network is reported in Fig. 4.10, after a nec-
essary graphical reorganization of the layout. According to what described in
section 2.5.1, the attack nodes are placed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. In the mid-
dle of the network, the node related to the protection devices and protocols are
depicted (notice that the nodes related to protocols are replicated as many times
as for the conditions of the triggered by tagged value).
The vulnerability evaluated with the parameters given in Table 4.1 is 6.07%. A
sensitivity analysis has been also conducted by implementing and running a trivial
Java application which modiﬁes the set of interest parameters. Speciﬁcally, three
diﬀerent studies have been performed that are described in the following:
1. thermal fnr VS PTZ fnr : the vulnerability is evaluated by varying the fnr
of the entire set of thermal cameras and the fnr of the PTZ cameras;
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Figure 4.10: BN Attack Scenario 1
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2. PTZ availability VS catching success probability : the vulnerability is ana-
lyzed with respect to the availability of the PTZ cameras and the probability
of detecting an intrusion, without the support of PTZ cameras and intruder
tracking;
3. SO availability VS SG availability : the vulnerability is evaluated with respect
to the availability of both SO and SG.
The results of the analyses are plotted in the ﬁgures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 respec-
tively. For each study, 882 evaluations (441 points for each surface, 21 values for
each axis) have been conducted on the bayesian model. Each study required about
30 minutes to complete the analysis on a personal computer (Intel Core i5, 4GB
of RAM).
Study 1. Fig. 4.11 reports the results for the vulnerability calculated by varying
the fnr of the thermal and of the PTZ cameras. Diﬀerent fnr values can be founded
for commercial cameras; for these reasons the fnr values considered in this study
varies in the range from 0% to 20% in order to assess the vulnerability in a very
large range of possibilities. In fact, with fnr of 0%, the depot vulnerability is
around 6%, reaching the maximum (about 24%) corresponding to an fnr of 20%.
Furthermore, as showed by the graph, the vulnerability gradient along the axis
related to PTZ is, in absolute value, lower than one measured along the other
axis. This happens since the thermal cameras enable the intervention protocol;
hence, if they don't work properly, the protocol is not executed.
Study 2. Fig. 4.12 depicts the trend of vulnerability with respect to the PTZs
availability and the success probability of the catching action, performed by SG
without the support of the PTZ cameras. This is because of considering the case
in which the tracking algorithm fails and the PTZ does not start. The availability
of the PTZ cameras varies from 99.78% to 99.98%, while the success probability
goes from 60% to 80%. The graph shows that the vulnerability does not change
very much varying these parameters: in fact, the variation from the maximum to
the minimum is minor than 0.3%.
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Figure 4.11: Study 1: thermal fnr VS PTZ fnr
Figure 4.12: Study 2: PTZ availability VS catching success probability
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Study 3. Fig. 4.13 reports the trend of vulnerability with respect to SO's and
SG's availability. These availability varies from 80% to 100% for both operators:as
expected, the maximum vulnerability (around 37%) corresponds to the minimum
value for availability, while maximum availability leads to the minimum vulnera-
bility of about 1%.
Figure 4.13: Study 3: SO availability VS SG availability
4.3.4.2 Scenario 2
This Section describes the results obtained by analyzing the Bayesian Network re-
sulting from the second attack scenario (radiological attack in train and in depot).
Bayesian model is depicted in Fig. 4.14.
Two diﬀerent analyses have been performed:
• depot vulnerability with respect to the radiological attack;
• train vulnerability with respect to the radiological attack.
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Figure 4.14: BN Attack Scenario 2
The depot vulnerability, evaluated using the parameters given in Table 4.1, is
17.20%, while the train vulnerability, using the same parameters, is 7.17%. These
values are justiﬁable since the train, with respect to the considered radiological
attack, is protected also by the CBRNe system while the depot is protected only by
the OEVD system. Also on this network, a sensitivity analysis has been conducted.
Speciﬁcally, two diﬀerent studies have been performed, and they are described in
the following:
1. OEVD fnr VS CBRNe fnr : vulnerability is evaluated by varying the fnr of
the eOEVD system and the fnr of the CBRNe system;
2. SO availability VS SG availability : vulnerability is evaluated with respect
to the availability of both SO and SG.
The results of the analyzes are plotted in the ﬁgures 4.15 and 4.16, respectively,
where the green color is used for drawing the surface related to vulnerability of
the depot, while the pink color is used for drawing the surface related to the
vulnerability of the train. For each study, 882 evaluations (441 points for each
surface, 21 values for each axis) have been conducted on the bayesian model. The
computational complexity is comparable to that of the previous studies.
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Study 1. Fig. 4.15 reports the values obtained for vulnerability calculated by
varying the fnr of the OEVD and CBRNe systems. The range of variation in this
study is 0%-20%, in order to assess the vulnerability in a very large set of possibil-
ities. As shown by the graph the vulnerability of the depot does not depend from
the CBRNe system, in fact the CBRNe protects just the train, while both depot
and train depends on the fnr of OEVD. Let us note that the train vulnerability
is obviously minor than the depot one. Speciﬁcally, the train vulnerability varies
from a minimum of 4.32% to a maximum of 9.98%, while the depot vulnerability
varies from 16.37% to 18.04% (remaining constant with respect to CBRNe fnr
variation).
Figure 4.15: Study 1: OEVD fnr VS CBRNe fnr
Study 2. Fig. 4.16 reports the vulnerability trends with respect to SO's and
SG's availability. These availability varies from 80% to 100% for both operators.
The maximum value of depot vulnerability is 43.68% while the minimum is 12%;
the train vulnerability varies from a maximum of 23.44% to a minimum of 4.3%.
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Figure 4.16: Study 2: SO availability VS SG availability
Conclusions
The research described in the previous chapters has addressed the issue of the
physical protection of critical infrastructures, considering two diﬀerent frames of
reference to enhance it. The ﬁrst operates at an analysis level (related to the
physical infrastructure), while the second at an architectural level (related to the
technological infrastructure).
At an analysis level, this thesis dealt with a model-driven process supporting the
eﬀective evaluation of a PPS. This is a basic activity for having a cost-eﬀective
physical protection, because it allows to ﬁnd the weak points which are to be
strengthened and also the points where the system is designed inadequately. The
deﬁnition of the process is driven by the objective to generate automatically quan-
titative vulnerability models for CIs. The proposed process was developed within
the METRIP project and it is based on a modeling approach which describes and
combines three main aspects involved in the eﬀective design of a physical pro-
tection system: attacks, assets and protection measures. Hence, the vulnerability
evaluation can be performed taking into account the characteristics of the assets,
the attack scenarios on these assets, the type and distribution of the protection
devices as well as the countermeasures undertaken to block an ongoing attack. To
this aim, the approach extends the Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) by apply-
ing proﬁling techniques in order to capture vulnerability and protection modeling
issues, and uses proper Model-to-Model transformations to generate a bayesian
model starting from UML artifacts. In the chapter 2 the CIP_V AM proﬁle is
described, as well as the transformational approach.
At an architectural level, this thesis describes an approach aimed at SoS realiza-
tion, where the added value is represented by the real application scenarios and
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related practical issues, addressed in the context of Secur-ED European research
project. The approach described in chapter /Chapter3 enables a highly collab-
orative environment (in terms of technologies, suppliers, and end-users), which
represents an innovative result for an open issue in the security of mass-transit
domain. Thanks to adoption of a SOA-based integration framework, many advan-
tages as well as a clear impact on the investment and operational life-cycle costs
have been experimented. Speciﬁcally, it allows to [43]:
• mitigate the propagation of damages, minimizing the disaster recovery in
time and space, in terms of resilience of transport systems;
• extend the life-cycle of the installed solutions by slowing down the need for
the replacement and the update of technologies, since the modularity allows
gradual adjustments whilst guaranteeing the service continuity;
• simplify and streamline the partners interactions despite a wide variety of
technologies;
• have the seamless integration of new technologies with the existing ones,
maximizing the return on investment by reducing the non-recurrent engi-
neering costs;
• adopt standards and open tools for testing procedures without dictating any
constraint about the implementation of applications, thus reducing the cost
of training;
• have a ﬂexible architecture not speciﬁc to operator, or city, or country, but
applicable at any critical context after some usual setup.
In conclusion, the architectural approach has highlighted how a viable interop-
erability solution can contribute to enhance the security of mass transportation
systems. In fact, the obtained results encourage the development of new solutions
and the investment in security technologies and cooperation. This is just a pre-
liminary SoS in this ﬁeld, but the obtained results, in real world demonstration,
encourages further investigation in the adoption of complex SoS architectures,
which fulﬁll the requirements reported in this work.
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At last, the case study in the chapter 4 has shown how two scenarios related to
speciﬁc threats, with a selected set of protection measures, are addressed with
both the approaches. The architectural one has highlighted the eﬀectiveness of
the solution in terms of reaction to the attacks, while the analytical one has al-
lowed to assign a conﬁdence level to the eﬀectiveness of the proposed solution.
As stated in the public summary of [103], in SECUR-ED the methodology used
for performing risk assessment is purely qualitative and not quantitative. On the
contrary, the analytical approach of this thesis provides probabilistic measures of
the vulnerability, that can be used in risk assessment process.
Thanks to a sensitivity analysis it is possible to state what is the range of vulner-
ability of the solution on varying speciﬁc parameters of protection systems such
as the availability and false negative rate. Furthermore, having a parameter for
quantifying the vulnerability of a solution is very strategic, because it can be used
for comparing multiple protection solutions. Although real tests are preferable, in
the CIP ﬁeld this is not always possible. For example in real metro systems, the
experimentation could require the usage of speciﬁc assets (trains, stations, etc.)
removing them from the operation and making them unavailable for the public
service. This could be very expensive for a public operator, so the number of tests
for evaluating more conﬁgurations of countermeasures could be very limited. For
this reason, an ad-hoc and rigorous analysis aimed at studying the whole system
under diﬀerent conditions, before the tests on ﬁeld, is a must. In addition, the
most suitable selection of the protection systems is further encouraged if exists an
open platform which allows an easy integration from a technological viewpoint.
Then, combining the approaches is possible to obtain an eﬀective enhancement
of the physical protection, not only at a certain time, but during the whole life
cycle of CI without constraints due to the obsolescence of the deployed technolo-
gies. The latter is one of the major feature to meet requirements in continuous
evolution and in a long-term scale.

Appendix A
CIP_VAM Library
The CIP_VAM library is composed by the following three packages.
BasicDT deﬁnes the following enumerations:
• RiskLevel represents a qualitative classiﬁcation of the risk level associated
with an Asset. Possible values are negligible, acceptable, tolerable and un-
acceptable.
• WeaponNature represents the nature of a weapon. Possible values are aerosol,
chemical agent, explosives, ﬁrebomb, ﬁrearms, radiological agent.
• Tactic is the physical nature of the weapon used to bring on the attack
(or a single action inside a complex attack). Possible values are armed at-
tack, arson, barricade, bombing, hijacking, hostage, intrusion, kidnapping,
sabotage, suicide, dispersion.
• ProtectionNature represents the nature of the possible used protection. Pos-
sible values are: block, thermal, electrical, chemical and acoustical.
• ActionKind allows to discriminate between simple actions and triggers; in
fact, the possible values are action and trigger.
• Level represents a generic qualitative level and is used in diﬀerent parts of
the proﬁle such as motivation and skill levels of both attackers and human
defenders. Possible values are very low, low, medium, high and very high.
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• OperatorType allows to set the type of an operator. Possible values are:
human and drone.
• AngularUnitKind is the measurement unit of the angle and allows to dis-
criminate between degree and radian. In fact, possible value are deg and
rad.
• AngularSpeedUnit represents the measurement unit of angular speed. Pos-
sible values are rad_per_sec (radian per second) and deg_per_sec (degree
per second).
• TransmissionTech is the transmission technology of data used by a sensor.
Possible values are wired, wireless and none.
• ProcessingType represents the kind of processing data. Possible values are
digital or analog.
• ZoomType allows to specify the zoom type of a camera. Possible value are
optical, digital and total.
GeometricDT contains both enumeration and structured data types. It deﬁnes:
• PolygonType is an enumeration of simple geometrical 2D shapes. Possible
values are: polygon, circle, rectangle and square.
• Point represents a point in a 3D space. It is a dataType (a tuple) having
three diﬀerent ﬁelds:
 X: x-axis coordinate of the point. It is a real value and it is optional
since the point can only have y and z coordinates;
 Y: y-axis coordinate of the point. It is a real value and it is optional
since the point can only have x and z coordinates;
 Z: z-axis coordinate of the point. It is a real value and it is optional
since the point can only have x and y coordinates.
• Shape represents a 2D shape. It is a dataType (a tuple) having several ﬁelds:
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 type: it is a PoligonType variable and assigns the type to the shape. It
is optional since the shape can be of a type not in the PolygonType set
of values;
 vertices: list of Points that constitute the border of the shape; vertices
have an undeﬁned number of Points;
 area: value that represents the numerical value of the area of the shape;
 perimeter: value that represents the length of the border of the shape;
 centre: it is a Point that represents the barycentre of the shape;
 length: length of the shape;
 width: width of the shape;
 radius: for circular shape, it indicates the radius of the shape.
• Solid represents a 3D geometrical volume. It is a dataType (a tuple) having
three diﬀerent ﬁelds:
 base: shape describing the base of the solid;
 height: value that represents the measure of the vertical dimension of
the solid;
 volume: it represents the volume of the solid.
• Angle is used to designate the measure of an angle. It is a dataType (a
tuple) having two ﬁelds:
 value: the size of the angle;
 unit: unit used to represent the angle.
StructuredDT contains the following types:
• Asset is the data type related to the economic values and risk of an asset:
 value: economic value of the asset;
 vulnerability: probability of being damaged given an attack;
 AttackProb: quantiﬁcation of the probability being attacked;
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 Risk: quantiﬁcation of the risk associated with the asset (according to
the well-assessed formula Risk = attackProb *Vulnerability*damage);
 riskLevel: qualitative level of the risk.
• Weapon represents a weapon used as a tool in an attack phase (an action).
It is a dataType having two diﬀerent ﬁelds:
 failureRate: rate of failure of the weapon;
 nature: physical nature of the weapon (kidnap, ﬁrearm, etc...) deter-
mined according to the AttackNature type previously expressed.
• Application represents the localization of the installation of a protection onto
an item (site or object):
 position: physical location of the application;
 direction: orientation of the protection (let us consider as an example
a camera that wants not only the point on which it has been ﬁxed but
also the one where the camera looks to);
 installation: Item on which the protection is installed.
• Threat represents a threat brought by an attack to an asset:
 name: name of the threats;
 target: item that is the asset toward which the attack is brought;
 eﬀect: percentage of the value of the asset damaged by a successful
threat.
• Impairment specializes Threats by adding some properties:
 latency: that is the latency of the propagation of the Impairment to
other aﬀected Impairements;
 for each propagation we have (as three arrays):
∗ propEﬀect: aﬀected Impairement;
∗ propProb: probability of having a propagation on the aﬀected Im-
pairement;
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∗ propCond: condition under which we have the propagation of the
Impairement.
• SpeedAngular serves to point out the speed angular of a PTZ camera. It is
characterized by:
 value: value of the angular speed;
 speedUnit: measurement unit determined according to the Angular-
SpeedUnit type expressed in the BasicDT package.
• Zoom is a structured element for specifying the data related to the zoom of
a camera:
 value: string representing the value of the zoom (i.e 12x);
 type: the type of zoom deﬁned in the ZoomType type previously ex-
pressed.
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